# Re: \[RFC PATCH v1 0/5\] Add support for O\_MAYEXEC

- List: linux-api
- 2 messages, 2 authors
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2018/12/147707/t

## Re: \[RFC PATCH v1 0/5\] Add support for O\_MAYEXEC

- From: Florian Weimer \<hidden\>
- Date: 2018-12-12 20:13:26 
- Message: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2018/12/147707.md

```text
* James Morris:

> If you're depending on the script interpreter to flag that the user may 
> execute code, this seems to be equivalent in security terms to depending 
> on the user.  e.g. what if the user uses ptrace and clears O_MAYEXEC?

The argument I've heard is this: Using ptrace (and adding the +x
attribute) are auditable events.

Florian
```

## Re: \[RFC PATCH v1 0/5\] Add support for O\_MAYEXEC

- From: James Morris \<jmorris@namei.org\>
- Date: 2018-12-12 23:40:59 
- Message: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2018/12/147706.md

```text
On Wed, 12 Dec 2018, Florian Weimer wrote:

> * James Morris:
> 
> > If you're depending on the script interpreter to flag that the user may 
> > execute code, this seems to be equivalent in security terms to depending 
> > on the user.  e.g. what if the user uses ptrace and clears O_MAYEXEC?
> 
> The argument I've heard is this: Using ptrace (and adding the +x
> attribute) are auditable events.

I guess you could also preload a modified libc which strips the flag.


-- 
James Morris
[ref]
```