# Re: \[kernel-hardening\] Re: \[PATCH resend 2/2\] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces

- From: Serge E. Hallyn \<hidden\>
- Date: 2017-11-09 18:05:39 
- List: linux-api
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2017/11/5129750
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/netdev/2017/11/5123940/t.md

```text
Quoting chris hyser (chris.hyser-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org):
> On 11/06/2017 10:23 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >I think I definately prefer what I mentioned in the email to Boris.
> >Basically a "permanent capability bounding set".  The normal bounding
> >set gets reset to a full set on every new user_ns creation.  In this
> >proposal, it would instead be set to the calling task's permanent
> >capability set, which starts (at boot) full, and which privileged
> >tasks can pull capabilities out of.
> 
> Actually, this may solve a similar problem I've been looking at. The
> idea was basically at strategic points in the kernel (possibly LSM
> hook sites, still evaluating, and probably syscall entry) validate
> that a task has not "magically" acquired capabilities that it or
> parent specifically said it cannot have and then take some action
> like say killing it immediately. Using your terms, basically make
> the "permanent capability set" a write-once privilege escalation
> defense. To handle the 0-day threat, perhaps make it writable but
> only with more "restrictive" values.

Would the existing capability bounding set not suffice for that?

The 'permanent' bounding set turns out to not be a good fit for
the problem being discussed in this thread, but please feel free
to start a new thread if you want to discuss your use case.
```
