# Re: \[PATCH net-next 1/3\] bpf: introduce current-\>pid, tgid, uid, gid, comm accessors

- From: Alexei Starovoitov \<hidden\>
- Date: 2015-06-12 23:56:00 
- List: linux-api
- Page: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2015/06/4515176
- Thread: https://ratatoskr.run/linux-api/2015/06/4515090/t.md

```text
On 6/12/15 4:47 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 4:38 PM, Alexei Starovoitov [ref] wrote:
>> On 6/12/15 4:25 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>
>>> It's a dangerous tool.  Also, shouldn't the returned uid match the
>>> namespace of the task that installed the probe, not the task that's
>>> being probed?
>>
>>
>> so leaking info to unprivileged apps is the concern?
>> The whole thing is for root only as you know.
>> The non-root is still far away. Today root needs to see the whole
>> kernel. That was the goal from the beginning.
>>
>
> This is more of a correctness issue than a security issue.  ISTM using
> current_user_ns() in a kprobe is asking for trouble.  It certainly
> allows any unprivilege user to show any uid it wants to the probe,
> which is probably not what the installer of the probe expects.

probe doesn't expect anything. it doesn't make any decisions.
bpf is read only. it's _visibility_ into the kernel.
It's not used for security.
When we start connecting eBPF to seccomp I would agree that uid
handling needs to be done carefully, but we're not there yet.
I don't want to kill _visibility_ because in some distant future
bpf becomes a decision making tool in security area and
get_current_uid() will return numbers that shouldn't be blindly
used to reject/accept a user requesting something. That's far away.
```