Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

41 messages, 3 authors, 2021-12-09 · open the first message on its own page

Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

From: Junio C Hamano <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 20:30:54

Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] writes:
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch(sigc->payload_type) {
+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+			signer_header = "committer";
+			break;
+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+			signer_header = "tagger";
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Ignore unknown payload types */
+			return 0;
+	}
The case arms should be indented to the same level as opening
switch().  Have SP between keyword "switch" and the expression
the statement switches on.

More importantly, can you explain why it is necessary to allow
callers to call this function with a random value in payload_type
and have it silently succeed?  Isn't it a programming error that
deserves a call to BUG("...")?

Thanks.

Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-28 08:02:18

On 27.10.21 22:30, Junio C Hamano wrote:
Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] writes:
quoted
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch(sigc->payload_type) {
+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+			signer_header = "committer";
+			break;
+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+			signer_header = "tagger";
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Ignore unknown payload types */
+			return 0;
+	}
The case arms should be indented to the same level as opening
switch().  Have SP between keyword "switch" and the expression
the statement switches on.
Thanks, will fix.
More importantly, can you explain why it is necessary to allow
callers to call this function with a random value in payload_type
and have it silently succeed?  Isn't it a programming error that
deserves a call to BUG("...")?

Thanks.
Not really. I will add a BUG() to the default case and only ignore the
known cases that we don't want to handle.

Thanks

[PATCH v3 1/7] ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:35:54

To be able to extend the payload metadata with things like its creation
timestamp or the creators ident we remove the payload parameters to
check_signature() and use the already existing sigc->payload field
instead, only adding the length field to the struct. This also allows
us to get rid of the xmemdupz() calls in the verify functions. Since
sigc is now used to input data as well as output the result move it to
the front of the function list.

 - Add payload_length to struct signature_check
 - Populate sigc.payload/payload_len on all call sites
 - Remove payload parameters to check_signature()
 - Remove payload parameters to internal verify_* functions and use sigc
   instead
 - Remove xmemdupz() used for verbose output since payload is now already
   populated.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 builtin/receive-pack.c |  6 ++++--
 commit.c               |  5 +++--
 fmt-merge-msg.c        |  4 ++--
 gpg-interface.c        | 37 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
 gpg-interface.h        |  6 +++---
 log-tree.c             |  8 ++++----
 tag.c                  |  4 ++--
 7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c
index 49b846d960..61ab63c2ea 100644
--- a/builtin/receive-pack.c
+++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c
@@ -769,8 +769,10 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
 		memset(&sigcheck, '\0', sizeof(sigcheck));
 
 		bogs = parse_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len);
-		check_signature(push_cert.buf, bogs, push_cert.buf + bogs,
-				push_cert.len - bogs, &sigcheck);
+		sigcheck.payload = xmemdupz(push_cert.buf, bogs);
+		sigcheck.payload_len = bogs;
+		check_signature(&sigcheck, push_cert.buf + bogs,
+				push_cert.len - bogs);
 
 		nonce_status = check_nonce(push_cert.buf, bogs);
 	}
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 551de4903c..64e040a99b 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1212,8 +1212,9 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-		signature.len, sigc);
+
+	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
  out:
 	strbuf_release(&payload);
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index 5216191488..deca1ea3a3 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
-			if (check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, sig.buf,
-					    sig.len, &sigc) &&
+			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
 				strbuf_addstr(&sig, "gpg verification failed.\n");
 			else
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 3e7255a2a9..75ab6faacb 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ struct gpg_format {
 	const char **verify_args;
 	const char **sigs;
 	int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 	int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ static const char *ssh_sigs[] = {
 };
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -343,14 +343,13 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		     NULL);
 
 	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, &gpg_stdout, 0,
+	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, &gpg_stdout, 0,
 			   &gpg_stderr, 0);
 	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
 	delete_tempfile(&temp);
 
 	ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL);
 	sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL);
 
@@ -426,8 +425,8 @@ static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -480,7 +479,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
 			     NULL);
-		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 
 		/*
@@ -526,7 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			}
 
 			sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 					   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 			sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
@@ -540,7 +539,6 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		}
 	}
 
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 	/* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */
@@ -562,8 +560,8 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
-	size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc)
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
 	struct gpg_format *fmt;
 	int status;
@@ -575,8 +573,7 @@ int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
-	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, payload, plen, signature,
-					   slen);
+	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
 		return !!status;
@@ -593,7 +590,7 @@ void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags)
 							    sigc->output;
 
 	if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload)
-		fputs(sigc->payload, stdout);
+		fwrite(sigc->payload, 1, sigc->payload_len, stdout);
 
 	if (output)
 		fputs(output, stderr);
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index beefacbb1e..5ee7d8b6b9 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
+	size_t payload_len;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
@@ -70,9 +71,8 @@ const char *get_signing_key(void);
  * Either a GPG KeyID or a SSH Key Fingerprint
  */
 const char *get_signing_key_id(void);
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen,
-		    const char *signature, size_t slen,
-		    struct signature_check *sigc);
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen);
 void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc,
 			    unsigned flags);
 
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index 644893fd8c..a46cf60e1e 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				 signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
 		show_sig_lines(opt, status, "No signature\n");
 	else
@@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
-		status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len,
-					 signature.buf, signature.len, &sigc);
+		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
 			strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.output);
 		else
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 3e18a41841..62fb09f5a5 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
 	if (!(flags & GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS))
 		print_signature_buffer(&sigc, flags);
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v3 2/7] ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:35:56

if ssh-keygen supports -Overify-time, add test keys marked as expired,
not yet valid and valid both within the test_tick timeframe and outside of it.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index a3f285f515..fc03c8f89b 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ test_lazy_prereq RFC1991 '
 GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY="${GNUPGHOME}/ed25519_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY="${GNUPGHOME}/rsa_2048_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED="${GNUPGHOME}/untrusted_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED="${GNUPGHOME}/expired_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/notyetvalid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_valid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_invalid_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE="${GNUPGHOME}/protected_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE="super_secret"
 GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS="${GNUPGHOME}/ssh.all_valid.allowedSignersFile"
@@ -119,7 +123,20 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+'
+
+test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
+	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
+	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v3 0/7] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:35:57

changes since v2:
 - fix swich/case indentation
 - BUG() on unknown payload types
 - improve test prereq by actually validating ssh-keygen functionality

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can extend
   this later.

Fabian Stelzer (7):
  ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
  ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
  ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
  ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

 Documentation/config/gpg.txt     |  5 ++
 builtin/receive-pack.c           |  6 ++-
 commit.c                         |  6 ++-
 fmt-merge-msg.c                  |  5 +-
 gpg-interface.c                  | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 gpg-interface.h                  | 15 ++++--
 log-tree.c                       | 10 ++--
 t/lib-gpg.sh                     | 36 ++++++++++---
 t/t4202-log.sh                   | 43 +++++++++++++++
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh         | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 +++++++++++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh     | 42 +++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  5 +-
 13 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

Range-diff against v2:
1:  11d275b53f = 1:  9f71fd8639 ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
2:  35ee285887 = 2:  5ee143bc38 ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
3:  ccfba23934 ! 3:  3183e84e2e ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
    @@ gpg-interface.c: static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sig
     +	struct ident_split ident;
     +	const char *signer_header;
     +
    -+	switch(sigc->payload_type) {
    -+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
    -+			signer_header = "committer";
    -+			break;
    -+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
    -+			signer_header = "tagger";
    -+			break;
    -+		default:
    -+			/* Ignore unknown payload types */
    -+			return 0;
    ++	switch (sigc->payload_type) {
    ++	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
    ++		signer_header = "committer";
    ++		break;
    ++	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
    ++		signer_header = "tagger";
    ++		break;
    ++	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED:
    ++	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT:
    ++		/* Ignore payloads we don't want to parse */
    ++		return 0;
    ++	default:
    ++		BUG("invalid value for sigc->payload_type");
     +	}
     +
     +	ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len);
4:  ef8178f88b = 4:  e35515867c ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
5:  c12457020e = 5:  e20177d950 ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
6:  fe17c60276 = 6:  2af2b6d098 ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
-:  ---------- > 7:  e6e2236a52 ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

base-commit: cd3e606211bb1cf8bc57f7d76bab98cc17a150bc
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v3 3/7] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:35:58

If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the
allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at
the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and
revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits.
This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply
ignore this flag and use the current time.
Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a
bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8.

Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature.
However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able
to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later.
Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it
from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the
payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct.

 - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct
   signature_check
 - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the
   payload type
 - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all
   ssh-keygen verification calls
 - Set the payload type when verifying commits
 - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date
   outside of key validity as well as within

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 Documentation/config/gpg.txt |  5 ++++
 commit.c                     |  1 +
 gpg-interface.c              | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 gpg-interface.h              |  9 ++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
index 4f30c7dbdd..c9be554c73 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file
 in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree.
 This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring.
 +
+Since OpensSSH 8.8 this file allows specifying a key lifetime using valid-after &
+valid-before options. Git will mark signatures as valid if the signing key was
+valid at the time of the signatures creation. This allows users to change a
+signing key without invalidating all previously made signatures.
++
 Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option
 (see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid.
 
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 64e040a99b..a348f085b2 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc->payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 75ab6faacb..330cfc5845 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -439,6 +439,13 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf verify_time = STRBUF_INIT;
+	const struct date_mode verify_date_mode = {
+		.type = DATE_STRFTIME,
+		.strftime_fmt = "%Y%m%d%H%M%S",
+		/* SSH signing key validity has no timezone information - Use the local timezone */
+		.local = 1,
+	};
 
 	if (!ssh_allowed_signers) {
 		error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification"));
@@ -456,11 +463,16 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (sigc->payload_timestamp)
+		strbuf_addf(&verify_time, "-Overify-time=%s",
+			show_date(sigc->payload_timestamp, 0, &verify_date_mode));
+
 	/* Find the principal from the signers */
 	strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program,
 		     "-Y", "find-principals",
 		     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 		     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+		     verify_time.buf,
 		     NULL);
 	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0,
 			   &ssh_principals_err, 0);
@@ -478,6 +490,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-Y", "check-novalidate",
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+			     verify_time.buf,
 			     NULL);
 		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
@@ -512,6 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 				     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 				     "-I", principal,
 				     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+				     verify_time.buf,
 				     NULL);
 
 			if (ssh_revocation_file) {
@@ -556,10 +570,46 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
+	strbuf_release(&verify_time);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch (sigc->payload_type) {
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+		signer_header = "committer";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+		signer_header = "tagger";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED:
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT:
+		/* Ignore payloads we don't want to parse */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		BUG("invalid value for sigc->payload_type");
+	}
+
+	ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len);
+	if (!ident_line || !ident_len)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (split_ident_line(&ident, ident_line, ident_len))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!sigc->payload_timestamp && ident.date_begin && ident.date_end)
+		sigc->payload_timestamp = parse_timestamp(ident.date_begin, NULL, 10);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
@@ -573,6 +623,9 @@ int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
+	if (parse_payload_metadata(sigc))
+		return 1;
+
 	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index 5ee7d8b6b9..b30cbdcd3d 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -15,9 +15,18 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 	TRUST_ULTIMATE,
 };
 
+enum payload_type {
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT,
+};
+
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
 	size_t payload_len;
+	enum payload_type payload_type;
+	timestamp_t payload_timestamp;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
diff --git a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
index badf3ed320..dae76ded0c 100755
--- a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
@@ -76,6 +76,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed commits' '
 	git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.mintrustlevel UNDEFINED &&
@@ -122,6 +139,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits failure on untrusted signature'
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit succeeds with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-commit timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits success with matching minTrustLevel' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.minTrustLevel fully &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v3 4/7] ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:36:00

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling git log.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 log-tree.c     |  2 ++
 t/t4202-log.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index a46cf60e1e..d3e7a40b64 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
@@ -583,6 +584,7 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
+		sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t4202-log.sh b/t/t4202-log.sh
index 7884e3d46b..ba855ec893 100755
--- a/t/t4202-log.sh
+++ b/t/t4202-log.sh
@@ -1677,6 +1677,24 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'setup sshkey signed branch' '
 	git commit -S -m signed_commit
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSM 'log x509 fingerprint' '
 	echo "F8BF62E0693D0694816377099909C779FA23FD65 | " >expect &&
 	git log -n1 --format="%GF | %GP" signed-x509 >actual &&
@@ -1714,6 +1732,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log --graph --show-signature ssh' '
 	grep "${GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 expired-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 notyetvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log show success with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedvalid-signed >actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedinvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPG 'log --graph --show-signature for merged tag' '
 	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" &&
 	git checkout -b plain main &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v3 5/7] ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:36:10

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling verify-tag.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
index 06c9dd6c93..1cb36b9ab8 100755
--- a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
@@ -48,6 +48,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed tags ssh' '
 	git tag -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m eighth eighth-signed-alt
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	(
@@ -80,6 +97,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag succeeds with tag date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-tag timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag failes with tag date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged ssh signature' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git cat-file tag seventh-signed >raw &&
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 62fb09f5a5..dfbcd7fcc2 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v3 6/7] ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:36:14

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when generating merge messages to
verify merged tags signatures key lifetimes.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 fmt-merge-msg.c          |  1 +
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index deca1ea3a3..e4f7810be2 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
+			sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index 06c5fb5615..2dd2423643 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -91,6 +91,26 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'created ssh signed commit and tag' '
 	git tag -s -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m signed-ssh-tag-msg-untrusted signed-untrusted-ssh-tag left
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	git checkout -b signed-expiry-ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos}" >expected &&
 
@@ -137,6 +157,40 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by expired ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . expired-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by not yet valid ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by valid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by invalid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging external branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos} of $(pwd)" >expected &&
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v3 7/7] ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-17 09:36:19

Do a full ssh signing, find-principals and verify operation in the test
prereq's to make sure ssh-keygen works as expected. Only generating the
keys and verifying its presence is not sufficient in some situations.
One example was ssh-keygen creating unusable ssh keys in cygwin because
of unsafe default permissions for the key files. The other a broken
openssh 8.7 that segfaulted on any find-principals operation. This
extended prereq check avoids future test breakages in case ssh-keygen or
any environment behaviour changes.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 19 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index fc03c8f89b..96cf0efebc 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -109,11 +109,7 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo $ssh_version | grep -q "find-principals:missing signature file"
 	test $? = 0 || exit 1;
 
-	# some broken versions of ssh-keygen segfault on find-principals;
-	# avoid testing with them.
-	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f /dev/null -s /dev/null
-	test $? = 139 && exit 1
-
+	# Setup some keys and an allowed signers file
 	mkdir -p "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	chmod 0700 "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	(setfacl -k "${GNUPGHOME}" 2>/dev/null || true) &&
@@ -123,12 +119,19 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null &&
+
+	# Verify if at least one key and ssh-keygen works as expected
+	echo "testpayload" | ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" > gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	echo "testpayload" | ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with number 1" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig
 '
 
 test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
 	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
 	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+
+	# Set up keys with key lifetimes
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
@@ -137,6 +140,10 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
 	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
+
+	# and verify ssh-keygen verifies the key lifetime
+	echo "testpayload" | ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" > gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig &&
+	! (ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with expired key" -s gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig)
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 0/7] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:11:34

changes since v3:
 - improve readability of prereq setup code by using heredoc and some 
   variables

changes since v2:
 - fix swich/case indentation
 - BUG() on unknown payload types
 - improve test prereq by actually validating ssh-keygen functionality

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can 
   extend
   this later.

Fabian Stelzer (7):
  ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
  ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
  ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
  ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

 Documentation/config/gpg.txt     |  5 ++
 builtin/receive-pack.c           |  6 ++-
 commit.c                         |  6 ++-
 fmt-merge-msg.c                  |  5 +-
 gpg-interface.c                  | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 gpg-interface.h                  | 15 ++++--
 log-tree.c                       | 10 ++--
 t/lib-gpg.sh                     | 62 ++++++++++++++++++----
 t/t4202-log.sh                   | 43 +++++++++++++++
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh         | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 +++++++++++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh     | 42 +++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  5 +-
 13 files changed, 341 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

Range-diff against v3:
1:  9f71fd8639 = 1:  c4447d30f2 ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
2:  5ee143bc38 = 2:  0bb1617529 ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
3:  3183e84e2e = 3:  f60bd1efd0 ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
4:  e35515867c = 4:  5fc0ad5c37 ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
5:  e20177d950 = 5:  f1c225871f ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
6:  2af2b6d098 = 6:  1cbd4dbb6b ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
7:  e6e2236a52 < -:  ---------- ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq
-:  ---------- > 7:  d60f4ec82c ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

base-commit: abe6bb3905392d5eb6b01fa6e54d7e784e0522aa
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 1/7] ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:11:35

To be able to extend the payload metadata with things like its creation
timestamp or the creators ident we remove the payload parameters to
check_signature() and use the already existing sigc->payload field
instead, only adding the length field to the struct. This also allows
us to get rid of the xmemdupz() calls in the verify functions. Since
sigc is now used to input data as well as output the result move it to
the front of the function list.

 - Add payload_length to struct signature_check
 - Populate sigc.payload/payload_len on all call sites
 - Remove payload parameters to check_signature()
 - Remove payload parameters to internal verify_* functions and use sigc
   instead
 - Remove xmemdupz() used for verbose output since payload is now already
   populated.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 builtin/receive-pack.c |  6 ++++--
 commit.c               |  5 +++--
 fmt-merge-msg.c        |  4 ++--
 gpg-interface.c        | 37 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
 gpg-interface.h        |  6 +++---
 log-tree.c             |  8 ++++----
 tag.c                  |  4 ++--
 7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c
index 49b846d960..61ab63c2ea 100644
--- a/builtin/receive-pack.c
+++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c
@@ -769,8 +769,10 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
 		memset(&sigcheck, '\0', sizeof(sigcheck));
 
 		bogs = parse_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len);
-		check_signature(push_cert.buf, bogs, push_cert.buf + bogs,
-				push_cert.len - bogs, &sigcheck);
+		sigcheck.payload = xmemdupz(push_cert.buf, bogs);
+		sigcheck.payload_len = bogs;
+		check_signature(&sigcheck, push_cert.buf + bogs,
+				push_cert.len - bogs);
 
 		nonce_status = check_nonce(push_cert.buf, bogs);
 	}
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 551de4903c..64e040a99b 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1212,8 +1212,9 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-		signature.len, sigc);
+
+	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
  out:
 	strbuf_release(&payload);
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index 5216191488..deca1ea3a3 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
-			if (check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, sig.buf,
-					    sig.len, &sigc) &&
+			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
 				strbuf_addstr(&sig, "gpg verification failed.\n");
 			else
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 3e7255a2a9..75ab6faacb 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ struct gpg_format {
 	const char **verify_args;
 	const char **sigs;
 	int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 	int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ static const char *ssh_sigs[] = {
 };
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -343,14 +343,13 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		     NULL);
 
 	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, &gpg_stdout, 0,
+	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, &gpg_stdout, 0,
 			   &gpg_stderr, 0);
 	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
 	delete_tempfile(&temp);
 
 	ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL);
 	sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL);
 
@@ -426,8 +425,8 @@ static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -480,7 +479,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
 			     NULL);
-		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 
 		/*
@@ -526,7 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			}
 
 			sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 					   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 			sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
@@ -540,7 +539,6 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		}
 	}
 
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 	/* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */
@@ -562,8 +560,8 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
-	size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc)
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
 	struct gpg_format *fmt;
 	int status;
@@ -575,8 +573,7 @@ int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
-	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, payload, plen, signature,
-					   slen);
+	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
 		return !!status;
@@ -593,7 +590,7 @@ void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags)
 							    sigc->output;
 
 	if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload)
-		fputs(sigc->payload, stdout);
+		fwrite(sigc->payload, 1, sigc->payload_len, stdout);
 
 	if (output)
 		fputs(output, stderr);
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index beefacbb1e..5ee7d8b6b9 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
+	size_t payload_len;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
@@ -70,9 +71,8 @@ const char *get_signing_key(void);
  * Either a GPG KeyID or a SSH Key Fingerprint
  */
 const char *get_signing_key_id(void);
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen,
-		    const char *signature, size_t slen,
-		    struct signature_check *sigc);
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen);
 void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc,
 			    unsigned flags);
 
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index 644893fd8c..a46cf60e1e 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				 signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
 		show_sig_lines(opt, status, "No signature\n");
 	else
@@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
-		status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len,
-					 signature.buf, signature.len, &sigc);
+		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
 			strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.output);
 		else
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 3e18a41841..62fb09f5a5 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
 	if (!(flags & GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS))
 		print_signature_buffer(&sigc, flags);
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 2/7] ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:11:40

if ssh-keygen supports -Overify-time, add test keys marked as expired,
not yet valid and valid both within the test_tick timeframe and outside of it.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index a3f285f515..fc03c8f89b 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ test_lazy_prereq RFC1991 '
 GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY="${GNUPGHOME}/ed25519_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY="${GNUPGHOME}/rsa_2048_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED="${GNUPGHOME}/untrusted_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED="${GNUPGHOME}/expired_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/notyetvalid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_valid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_invalid_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE="${GNUPGHOME}/protected_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE="super_secret"
 GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS="${GNUPGHOME}/ssh.all_valid.allowedSignersFile"
@@ -119,7 +123,20 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+'
+
+test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
+	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
+	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 3/7] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:11:54

If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the
allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at
the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and
revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits.
This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply
ignore this flag and use the current time.
Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a
bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8.

Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature.
However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able
to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later.
Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it
from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the
payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct.

 - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct
   signature_check
 - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the
   payload type
 - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all
   ssh-keygen verification calls
 - Set the payload type when verifying commits
 - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date
   outside of key validity as well as within

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 Documentation/config/gpg.txt |  5 ++++
 commit.c                     |  1 +
 gpg-interface.c              | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 gpg-interface.h              |  9 ++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
index 4f30c7dbdd..c9be554c73 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file
 in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree.
 This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring.
 +
+Since OpensSSH 8.8 this file allows specifying a key lifetime using valid-after &
+valid-before options. Git will mark signatures as valid if the signing key was
+valid at the time of the signatures creation. This allows users to change a
+signing key without invalidating all previously made signatures.
++
 Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option
 (see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid.
 
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 64e040a99b..a348f085b2 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc->payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 75ab6faacb..330cfc5845 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -439,6 +439,13 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf verify_time = STRBUF_INIT;
+	const struct date_mode verify_date_mode = {
+		.type = DATE_STRFTIME,
+		.strftime_fmt = "%Y%m%d%H%M%S",
+		/* SSH signing key validity has no timezone information - Use the local timezone */
+		.local = 1,
+	};
 
 	if (!ssh_allowed_signers) {
 		error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification"));
@@ -456,11 +463,16 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (sigc->payload_timestamp)
+		strbuf_addf(&verify_time, "-Overify-time=%s",
+			show_date(sigc->payload_timestamp, 0, &verify_date_mode));
+
 	/* Find the principal from the signers */
 	strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program,
 		     "-Y", "find-principals",
 		     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 		     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+		     verify_time.buf,
 		     NULL);
 	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0,
 			   &ssh_principals_err, 0);
@@ -478,6 +490,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-Y", "check-novalidate",
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+			     verify_time.buf,
 			     NULL);
 		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
@@ -512,6 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 				     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 				     "-I", principal,
 				     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+				     verify_time.buf,
 				     NULL);
 
 			if (ssh_revocation_file) {
@@ -556,10 +570,46 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
+	strbuf_release(&verify_time);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch (sigc->payload_type) {
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+		signer_header = "committer";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+		signer_header = "tagger";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED:
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT:
+		/* Ignore payloads we don't want to parse */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		BUG("invalid value for sigc->payload_type");
+	}
+
+	ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len);
+	if (!ident_line || !ident_len)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (split_ident_line(&ident, ident_line, ident_len))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!sigc->payload_timestamp && ident.date_begin && ident.date_end)
+		sigc->payload_timestamp = parse_timestamp(ident.date_begin, NULL, 10);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
@@ -573,6 +623,9 @@ int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
+	if (parse_payload_metadata(sigc))
+		return 1;
+
 	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index 5ee7d8b6b9..b30cbdcd3d 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -15,9 +15,18 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 	TRUST_ULTIMATE,
 };
 
+enum payload_type {
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT,
+};
+
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
 	size_t payload_len;
+	enum payload_type payload_type;
+	timestamp_t payload_timestamp;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
diff --git a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
index badf3ed320..dae76ded0c 100755
--- a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
@@ -76,6 +76,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed commits' '
 	git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.mintrustlevel UNDEFINED &&
@@ -122,6 +139,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits failure on untrusted signature'
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit succeeds with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-commit timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits success with matching minTrustLevel' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.minTrustLevel fully &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 4/7] ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:12:01

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling git log.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 log-tree.c     |  2 ++
 t/t4202-log.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index a46cf60e1e..d3e7a40b64 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
@@ -583,6 +584,7 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
+		sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t4202-log.sh b/t/t4202-log.sh
index 7884e3d46b..ba855ec893 100755
--- a/t/t4202-log.sh
+++ b/t/t4202-log.sh
@@ -1677,6 +1677,24 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'setup sshkey signed branch' '
 	git commit -S -m signed_commit
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSM 'log x509 fingerprint' '
 	echo "F8BF62E0693D0694816377099909C779FA23FD65 | " >expect &&
 	git log -n1 --format="%GF | %GP" signed-x509 >actual &&
@@ -1714,6 +1732,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log --graph --show-signature ssh' '
 	grep "${GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 expired-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 notyetvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log show success with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedvalid-signed >actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedinvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPG 'log --graph --show-signature for merged tag' '
 	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" &&
 	git checkout -b plain main &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 5/7] ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:13:49

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling verify-tag.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
index 06c9dd6c93..1cb36b9ab8 100755
--- a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
@@ -48,6 +48,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed tags ssh' '
 	git tag -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m eighth eighth-signed-alt
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	(
@@ -80,6 +97,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag succeeds with tag date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-tag timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag failes with tag date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged ssh signature' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git cat-file tag seventh-signed >raw &&
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 62fb09f5a5..dfbcd7fcc2 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 6/7] ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:13:53

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when generating merge messages to
verify merged tags signatures key lifetimes.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 fmt-merge-msg.c          |  1 +
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index deca1ea3a3..e4f7810be2 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
+			sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index 06c5fb5615..2dd2423643 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -91,6 +91,26 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'created ssh signed commit and tag' '
 	git tag -s -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m signed-ssh-tag-msg-untrusted signed-untrusted-ssh-tag left
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	git checkout -b signed-expiry-ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos}" >expected &&
 
@@ -137,6 +157,40 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by expired ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . expired-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by not yet valid ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by valid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by invalid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging external branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos} of $(pwd)" >expected &&
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v4 7/7] ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-30 14:13:58

Do a full ssh signing, find-principals and verify operation in the test
prereq's to make sure ssh-keygen works as expected. Only generating the
keys and verifying its presence is not sufficient in some situations.
One example was ssh-keygen creating unusable ssh keys in cygwin because
of unsafe default permissions for the key files. The other a broken
openssh 8.7 that segfaulted on any find-principals operation. This
extended prereq check avoids future test breakages in case ssh-keygen or
any environment behaviour changes.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index fc03c8f89b..3fadfcb306 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -109,34 +109,61 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo $ssh_version | grep -q "find-principals:missing signature file"
 	test $? = 0 || exit 1;
 
-	# some broken versions of ssh-keygen segfault on find-principals;
-	# avoid testing with them.
-	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f /dev/null -s /dev/null
-	test $? = 139 && exit 1
-
+	# Setup some keys and an allowed signers file
 	mkdir -p "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	chmod 0700 "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	(setfacl -k "${GNUPGHOME}" 2>/dev/null || true) &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 1\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -N "" -C "git rsa2048 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null &&
+
+	cat >"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
+	"principal with number 1" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 2" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 3" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")"
+	EOF
+
+	# Verify if at least one key and ssh-keygen works as expected
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with number 1" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig
 '
 
 test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
 	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
 	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+
+	# Set up keys with key lifetimes
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_valid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_invalid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_expired=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
+	key_notyetvalid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub") &&
+
+	# Timestamps outside of test_tick span
+	ts2005a=20050401000000 ts2005b=200504020000 &&
+	# Timestamps within test_tick span
+	ts2005c=20050407000000 ts2005d=200504100000 &&
+	# Definitely not yet valid / expired timestamps
+	ts2000=20000101000000 ts2999=29990101000000 &&
+
+	cat >>"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
+	"timeboxed valid key" valid-after="$ts2005c",valid-before="$ts2005d" $key_valid"
+	"timeboxed invalid key" valid-after="$ts2005a",valid-before="$ts2005b" $key_invalid"
+	"principal with expired key" valid-before="$ts2000" $key_expired"
+	"principal with not yet valid key" valid-after="$ts2999" $key_notyetvalid"
+	EOF
+
+	# and verify ssh-keygen verifies the key lifetime
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig &&
+	! (ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with expired key" -s gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig)
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1

Re: [PATCH v4 7/7] ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

From: Junio C Hamano <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-02 00:18:24

Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] writes:
Do a full ssh signing, find-principals and verify operation in the test
prereq's to make sure ssh-keygen works as expected. Only generating the
keys and verifying its presence is not sufficient in some situations.
One example was ssh-keygen creating unusable ssh keys in cygwin because
of unsafe default permissions for the key files. The other a broken
openssh 8.7 that segfaulted on any find-principals operation. This
extended prereq check avoids future test breakages in case ssh-keygen or
any environment behaviour changes.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
The way keys are set-up has become much easier to follow.

This unfortunately interacts with the old way of adding a test key
done in [off-list ref] 350a2518 (ssh
signing: support non ssh-* keytypes, 2021-11-19)

Here is my attempt (which is in 'seen') to resolve the inevitable
merge conflicts between the topics. 

Thanks.

commit fa6c2973744b419c95b5eaf6a697c795ab7823fa
Merge: 2a8505f6a0 3b4b5a793a
Author: Junio C Hamano [off-list ref]
Date:   Wed Dec 1 16:01:54 2021 -0800

    Merge branch 'fs/ssh-signing-other-keytypes' into jch
    
    * fs/ssh-signing-other-keytypes:
      ssh signing: make sign/amend test more resilient
      ssh signing: support non ssh-* keytypes
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index ff944f0548..3e7ee1386a 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -117,13 +117,14 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >/dev/null &&
 	ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -N "" -C "git rsa2048 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}" >/dev/null &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
-<<<<<<< 2a8505f6a0 (Merge branch 'fs/ssh-signing-key-lifetime' into jch)
+	ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}" >/dev/null &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null &&
 
 	cat >"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
 	"principal with number 1" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")"
 	"principal with number 2" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")"
 	"principal with number 3" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 4" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}.pub")"
 	EOF
 
 	# Verify if at least one key and ssh-keygen works as expected
@@ -166,15 +167,6 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
 	echo "testpayload" |
 	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig &&
 	! (ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with expired key" -s gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig)
-||||||| cd3e606211
-	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
-=======
-	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}" >/dev/null
-	echo "\"principal with number 4\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
->>>>>>> 3b4b5a793a (ssh signing: make sign/amend test more resilient)
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {

Re: [PATCH v4 7/7] ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-02 09:31:31

On 01.12.2021 16:18, Junio C Hamano wrote:
Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] writes:
quoted
Do a full ssh signing, find-principals and verify operation in the test
prereq's to make sure ssh-keygen works as expected. Only generating the
keys and verifying its presence is not sufficient in some situations.
One example was ssh-keygen creating unusable ssh keys in cygwin because
of unsafe default permissions for the key files. The other a broken
openssh 8.7 that segfaulted on any find-principals operation. This
extended prereq check avoids future test breakages in case ssh-keygen or
any environment behaviour changes.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
The way keys are set-up has become much easier to follow.

This unfortunately interacts with the old way of adding a test key
done in [off-list ref] 350a2518 (ssh
signing: support non ssh-* keytypes, 2021-11-19)

Here is my attempt (which is in 'seen') to resolve the inevitable
merge conflicts between the topics.
Yes, that looks good. In this case the conflict is rather trivial, but how 
could i prevent this / make it easier for you to merge these?
Especially since in this case the conflict only arose after a reroll when 
both topics were already in seen. For a new topic i can of course make them 
as "on top of XXX". Should I in the future rebase the "support non ssh-* 
keytypes" topic on top of this series and mark it as such? Or whats a good 
way to deal with things like this? (besides avoiding merge conflicts 
altogether :D)

Thanks
quoted hunk
Thanks.

commit fa6c2973744b419c95b5eaf6a697c795ab7823fa
Merge: 2a8505f6a0 3b4b5a793a
Author: Junio C Hamano [off-list ref]
Date:   Wed Dec 1 16:01:54 2021 -0800

   Merge branch 'fs/ssh-signing-other-keytypes' into jch

   * fs/ssh-signing-other-keytypes:
     ssh signing: make sign/amend test more resilient
     ssh signing: support non ssh-* keytypes
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index ff944f0548..3e7ee1386a 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -117,13 +117,14 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >/dev/null &&
	ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -N "" -C "git rsa2048 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}" >/dev/null &&
	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
-<<<<<<< 2a8505f6a0 (Merge branch 'fs/ssh-signing-key-lifetime' into jch)
+	ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}" >/dev/null &&
	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null &&

	cat >"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
	"principal with number 1" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")"
	"principal with number 2" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")"
	"principal with number 3" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 4" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}.pub")"
	EOF

	# Verify if at least one key and ssh-keygen works as expected
@@ -166,15 +167,6 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
	echo "testpayload" |
	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig &&
	! (ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with expired key" -s gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig)
-||||||| cd3e606211
-	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
-=======
-	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}" >/dev/null
-	echo "\"principal with number 4\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_ECDSA}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
->>>>>>> 3b4b5a793a (ssh signing: make sign/amend test more resilient)
'

sanitize_pgp() {

Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

From: SZEDER Gábor <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-05 19:23:49

On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 03:11:11PM +0100, Fabian Stelzer wrote:
quoted hunk
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index 06c5fb5615..2dd2423643 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -91,6 +91,26 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'created ssh signed commit and tag' '
 	git tag -s -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m signed-ssh-tag-msg-untrusted signed-untrusted-ssh-tag left
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	git checkout -b signed-expiry-ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos}" >expected &&
 
@@ -137,6 +157,40 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by expired ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . expired-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
Are these messages supposed to go to standard output or error?  If
it's the former, then please drop the unnecessary (and confusing)
'2>&1' redirection, but if it's the latter, then save and 'grep' only
stderr.
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by not yet valid ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by valid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by invalid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging external branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos} of $(pwd)" >expected &&
 
-- 
2.31.1

Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:00:00

On 05.12.2021 20:23, SZEDER Gábor wrote:
On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 03:11:11PM +0100, Fabian Stelzer wrote:
quoted
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by expired ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . expired-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
Are these messages supposed to go to standard output or error?  If
it's the former, then please drop the unnecessary (and confusing)
'2>&1' redirection, but if it's the latter, then save and 'grep' only
stderr.
You are right, these are not correct. I copied the fmt-merge-msg calls from 
the GPG tests a bit above which grep for the merged tag name and for gpg 
signature output (i assume those two things go to stdout/err respectively).  
I will check and create a new patch series for fixing up all of these.

Thanks

[PATCH v5 0/8] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:33:52

changes since v4:
 - removed unneccessary io redir in merge-msg tests
 - added grep for merged tag to gpgssh merge-msg tests

changes since v3:
 - improve readability of prereq setup code by using heredoc and some
   variables

changes since v2:
 - fix swich/case indentation
 - BUG() on unknown payload types
 - improve test prereq by actually validating ssh-keygen functionality

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can
   extend
   this later.

Fabian Stelzer (8):
  ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
  ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
  ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
  ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq
  t/fmt-merge-msg: make gpg/ssh tests more specific

 Documentation/config/gpg.txt     |  5 ++
 builtin/receive-pack.c           |  6 ++-
 commit.c                         |  6 ++-
 fmt-merge-msg.c                  |  5 +-
 gpg-interface.c                  | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 gpg-interface.h                  | 15 ++++--
 log-tree.c                       | 10 ++--
 t/lib-gpg.sh                     | 62 ++++++++++++++++++----
 t/t4202-log.sh                   | 43 +++++++++++++++
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh         | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 +++++++++++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh     | 42 +++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  5 +-
 13 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

Range-diff against v4:
1:  c4447d30f2 = 1:  c4447d30f2 ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
2:  0bb1617529 = 2:  0bb1617529 ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
3:  f60bd1efd0 = 3:  f60bd1efd0 ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
4:  5fc0ad5c37 = 4:  5fc0ad5c37 ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
5:  f1c225871f = 5:  f1c225871f ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
6:  1cbd4dbb6b = 6:  1cbd4dbb6b ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
7:  d60f4ec82c = 7:  d60f4ec82c ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq
-:  ---------- > 8:  679a02d1fe t/fmt-merge-msg: make gpg/ssh tests more specific
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 1/8] ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:33:53

To be able to extend the payload metadata with things like its creation
timestamp or the creators ident we remove the payload parameters to
check_signature() and use the already existing sigc->payload field
instead, only adding the length field to the struct. This also allows
us to get rid of the xmemdupz() calls in the verify functions. Since
sigc is now used to input data as well as output the result move it to
the front of the function list.

 - Add payload_length to struct signature_check
 - Populate sigc.payload/payload_len on all call sites
 - Remove payload parameters to check_signature()
 - Remove payload parameters to internal verify_* functions and use sigc
   instead
 - Remove xmemdupz() used for verbose output since payload is now already
   populated.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 builtin/receive-pack.c |  6 ++++--
 commit.c               |  5 +++--
 fmt-merge-msg.c        |  4 ++--
 gpg-interface.c        | 37 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
 gpg-interface.h        |  6 +++---
 log-tree.c             |  8 ++++----
 tag.c                  |  4 ++--
 7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c
index 49b846d960..61ab63c2ea 100644
--- a/builtin/receive-pack.c
+++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c
@@ -769,8 +769,10 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
 		memset(&sigcheck, '\0', sizeof(sigcheck));
 
 		bogs = parse_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len);
-		check_signature(push_cert.buf, bogs, push_cert.buf + bogs,
-				push_cert.len - bogs, &sigcheck);
+		sigcheck.payload = xmemdupz(push_cert.buf, bogs);
+		sigcheck.payload_len = bogs;
+		check_signature(&sigcheck, push_cert.buf + bogs,
+				push_cert.len - bogs);
 
 		nonce_status = check_nonce(push_cert.buf, bogs);
 	}
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 551de4903c..64e040a99b 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1212,8 +1212,9 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-		signature.len, sigc);
+
+	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
  out:
 	strbuf_release(&payload);
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index 5216191488..deca1ea3a3 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
-			if (check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, sig.buf,
-					    sig.len, &sigc) &&
+			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
 				strbuf_addstr(&sig, "gpg verification failed.\n");
 			else
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 3e7255a2a9..75ab6faacb 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ struct gpg_format {
 	const char **verify_args;
 	const char **sigs;
 	int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 	int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ static const char *ssh_sigs[] = {
 };
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -343,14 +343,13 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		     NULL);
 
 	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, &gpg_stdout, 0,
+	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, &gpg_stdout, 0,
 			   &gpg_stderr, 0);
 	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
 	delete_tempfile(&temp);
 
 	ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL);
 	sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL);
 
@@ -426,8 +425,8 @@ static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -480,7 +479,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
 			     NULL);
-		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 
 		/*
@@ -526,7 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			}
 
 			sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 					   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 			sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
@@ -540,7 +539,6 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		}
 	}
 
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 	/* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */
@@ -562,8 +560,8 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
-	size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc)
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
 	struct gpg_format *fmt;
 	int status;
@@ -575,8 +573,7 @@ int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
-	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, payload, plen, signature,
-					   slen);
+	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
 		return !!status;
@@ -593,7 +590,7 @@ void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags)
 							    sigc->output;
 
 	if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload)
-		fputs(sigc->payload, stdout);
+		fwrite(sigc->payload, 1, sigc->payload_len, stdout);
 
 	if (output)
 		fputs(output, stderr);
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index beefacbb1e..5ee7d8b6b9 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
+	size_t payload_len;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
@@ -70,9 +71,8 @@ const char *get_signing_key(void);
  * Either a GPG KeyID or a SSH Key Fingerprint
  */
 const char *get_signing_key_id(void);
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen,
-		    const char *signature, size_t slen,
-		    struct signature_check *sigc);
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen);
 void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc,
 			    unsigned flags);
 
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index 644893fd8c..a46cf60e1e 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				 signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
 		show_sig_lines(opt, status, "No signature\n");
 	else
@@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
-		status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len,
-					 signature.buf, signature.len, &sigc);
+		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
 			strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.output);
 		else
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 3e18a41841..62fb09f5a5 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
 	if (!(flags & GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS))
 		print_signature_buffer(&sigc, flags);
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 2/8] ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:33:58

if ssh-keygen supports -Overify-time, add test keys marked as expired,
not yet valid and valid both within the test_tick timeframe and outside of it.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index a3f285f515..fc03c8f89b 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ test_lazy_prereq RFC1991 '
 GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY="${GNUPGHOME}/ed25519_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY="${GNUPGHOME}/rsa_2048_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED="${GNUPGHOME}/untrusted_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED="${GNUPGHOME}/expired_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/notyetvalid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_valid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_invalid_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE="${GNUPGHOME}/protected_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE="super_secret"
 GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS="${GNUPGHOME}/ssh.all_valid.allowedSignersFile"
@@ -119,7 +123,20 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+'
+
+test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
+	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
+	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 3/8] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:33:58

If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the
allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at
the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and
revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits.
This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply
ignore this flag and use the current time.
Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a
bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8.

Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature.
However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able
to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later.
Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it
from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the
payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct.

 - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct
   signature_check
 - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the
   payload type
 - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all
   ssh-keygen verification calls
 - Set the payload type when verifying commits
 - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date
   outside of key validity as well as within

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 Documentation/config/gpg.txt |  5 ++++
 commit.c                     |  1 +
 gpg-interface.c              | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 gpg-interface.h              |  9 ++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
index 4f30c7dbdd..c9be554c73 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file
 in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree.
 This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring.
 +
+Since OpensSSH 8.8 this file allows specifying a key lifetime using valid-after &
+valid-before options. Git will mark signatures as valid if the signing key was
+valid at the time of the signatures creation. This allows users to change a
+signing key without invalidating all previously made signatures.
++
 Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option
 (see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid.
 
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 64e040a99b..a348f085b2 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc->payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 75ab6faacb..330cfc5845 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -439,6 +439,13 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf verify_time = STRBUF_INIT;
+	const struct date_mode verify_date_mode = {
+		.type = DATE_STRFTIME,
+		.strftime_fmt = "%Y%m%d%H%M%S",
+		/* SSH signing key validity has no timezone information - Use the local timezone */
+		.local = 1,
+	};
 
 	if (!ssh_allowed_signers) {
 		error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification"));
@@ -456,11 +463,16 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (sigc->payload_timestamp)
+		strbuf_addf(&verify_time, "-Overify-time=%s",
+			show_date(sigc->payload_timestamp, 0, &verify_date_mode));
+
 	/* Find the principal from the signers */
 	strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program,
 		     "-Y", "find-principals",
 		     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 		     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+		     verify_time.buf,
 		     NULL);
 	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0,
 			   &ssh_principals_err, 0);
@@ -478,6 +490,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-Y", "check-novalidate",
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+			     verify_time.buf,
 			     NULL);
 		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
@@ -512,6 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 				     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 				     "-I", principal,
 				     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+				     verify_time.buf,
 				     NULL);
 
 			if (ssh_revocation_file) {
@@ -556,10 +570,46 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
+	strbuf_release(&verify_time);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch (sigc->payload_type) {
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+		signer_header = "committer";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+		signer_header = "tagger";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED:
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT:
+		/* Ignore payloads we don't want to parse */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		BUG("invalid value for sigc->payload_type");
+	}
+
+	ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len);
+	if (!ident_line || !ident_len)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (split_ident_line(&ident, ident_line, ident_len))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!sigc->payload_timestamp && ident.date_begin && ident.date_end)
+		sigc->payload_timestamp = parse_timestamp(ident.date_begin, NULL, 10);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
@@ -573,6 +623,9 @@ int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
+	if (parse_payload_metadata(sigc))
+		return 1;
+
 	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index 5ee7d8b6b9..b30cbdcd3d 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -15,9 +15,18 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 	TRUST_ULTIMATE,
 };
 
+enum payload_type {
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT,
+};
+
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
 	size_t payload_len;
+	enum payload_type payload_type;
+	timestamp_t payload_timestamp;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
diff --git a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
index badf3ed320..dae76ded0c 100755
--- a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
@@ -76,6 +76,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed commits' '
 	git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.mintrustlevel UNDEFINED &&
@@ -122,6 +139,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits failure on untrusted signature'
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit succeeds with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-commit timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits success with matching minTrustLevel' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.minTrustLevel fully &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 4/8] ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:33:59

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling git log.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 log-tree.c     |  2 ++
 t/t4202-log.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index a46cf60e1e..d3e7a40b64 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
@@ -583,6 +584,7 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
+		sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t4202-log.sh b/t/t4202-log.sh
index 7884e3d46b..ba855ec893 100755
--- a/t/t4202-log.sh
+++ b/t/t4202-log.sh
@@ -1677,6 +1677,24 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'setup sshkey signed branch' '
 	git commit -S -m signed_commit
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSM 'log x509 fingerprint' '
 	echo "F8BF62E0693D0694816377099909C779FA23FD65 | " >expect &&
 	git log -n1 --format="%GF | %GP" signed-x509 >actual &&
@@ -1714,6 +1732,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log --graph --show-signature ssh' '
 	grep "${GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 expired-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 notyetvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log show success with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedvalid-signed >actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedinvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPG 'log --graph --show-signature for merged tag' '
 	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" &&
 	git checkout -b plain main &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 5/8] ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:34:01

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling verify-tag.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
index 06c9dd6c93..1cb36b9ab8 100755
--- a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
@@ -48,6 +48,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed tags ssh' '
 	git tag -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m eighth eighth-signed-alt
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	(
@@ -80,6 +97,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag succeeds with tag date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-tag timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag failes with tag date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged ssh signature' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git cat-file tag seventh-signed >raw &&
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 62fb09f5a5..dfbcd7fcc2 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 6/8] ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:34:05

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when generating merge messages to
verify merged tags signatures key lifetimes.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 fmt-merge-msg.c          |  1 +
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index deca1ea3a3..e4f7810be2 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
+			sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index 06c5fb5615..2dd2423643 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -91,6 +91,26 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'created ssh signed commit and tag' '
 	git tag -s -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m signed-ssh-tag-msg-untrusted signed-untrusted-ssh-tag left
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	git checkout -b signed-expiry-ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos}" >expected &&
 
@@ -137,6 +157,40 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by expired ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . expired-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by not yet valid ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by valid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by invalid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging external branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos} of $(pwd)" >expected &&
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 7/8] ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:34:07

Do a full ssh signing, find-principals and verify operation in the test
prereq's to make sure ssh-keygen works as expected. Only generating the
keys and verifying its presence is not sufficient in some situations.
One example was ssh-keygen creating unusable ssh keys in cygwin because
of unsafe default permissions for the key files. The other a broken
openssh 8.7 that segfaulted on any find-principals operation. This
extended prereq check avoids future test breakages in case ssh-keygen or
any environment behaviour changes.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index fc03c8f89b..3fadfcb306 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -109,34 +109,61 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo $ssh_version | grep -q "find-principals:missing signature file"
 	test $? = 0 || exit 1;
 
-	# some broken versions of ssh-keygen segfault on find-principals;
-	# avoid testing with them.
-	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f /dev/null -s /dev/null
-	test $? = 139 && exit 1
-
+	# Setup some keys and an allowed signers file
 	mkdir -p "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	chmod 0700 "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	(setfacl -k "${GNUPGHOME}" 2>/dev/null || true) &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 1\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -N "" -C "git rsa2048 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null &&
+
+	cat >"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
+	"principal with number 1" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 2" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 3" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")"
+	EOF
+
+	# Verify if at least one key and ssh-keygen works as expected
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with number 1" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig
 '
 
 test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
 	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
 	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+
+	# Set up keys with key lifetimes
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_valid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_invalid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_expired=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
+	key_notyetvalid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub") &&
+
+	# Timestamps outside of test_tick span
+	ts2005a=20050401000000 ts2005b=200504020000 &&
+	# Timestamps within test_tick span
+	ts2005c=20050407000000 ts2005d=200504100000 &&
+	# Definitely not yet valid / expired timestamps
+	ts2000=20000101000000 ts2999=29990101000000 &&
+
+	cat >>"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
+	"timeboxed valid key" valid-after="$ts2005c",valid-before="$ts2005d" $key_valid"
+	"timeboxed invalid key" valid-after="$ts2005a",valid-before="$ts2005b" $key_invalid"
+	"principal with expired key" valid-before="$ts2000" $key_expired"
+	"principal with not yet valid key" valid-after="$ts2999" $key_notyetvalid"
+	EOF
+
+	# and verify ssh-keygen verifies the key lifetime
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig &&
+	! (ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with expired key" -s gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig)
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v5 8/8] t/fmt-merge-msg: make gpg/ssh tests more specific

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-08 16:34:10

All the GPG, GPGSSH and the new GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME tests are redirecing
stdout as well as stderr to `actual` and grep for success/failure over
the resulting flie. However, no output is printed on stderr and we do
not need to include it in the grep. The newer SSH signing based tests
are also missing a grep for the merged tag to make sure the merge
message is correct.

- remove unneccessary 2>&1 redirects
- add grep for merged tag to gpgssh* tests

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 21 +++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index 2dd2423643..12a1e62bf0 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 test_expect_success GPG 'message for merging local tag signed by good key' '
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-good-tag &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
 	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}signed-good-tag${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "^# gpg: Signature made" actual &&
 	grep "^# gpg: Good signature from" actual
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'message for merging local tag signed by good key' '
 test_expect_success GPG 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown key' '
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-good-tag &&
-	GNUPGHOME=. git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	GNUPGHOME=. git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
 	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}signed-good-tag${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "^# gpg: Signature made" actual &&
 	grep -E "^# gpg: Can${apos}t check signature: (public key not found|No public key)" actual
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by good ssh key
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-good-ssh-tag &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
 '
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-untrusted-ssh-tag &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}signed-untrusted-ssh-tag${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
@@ -162,7 +163,8 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag sign
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . expired-signed &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}expired-signed${apos}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
@@ -170,7 +172,8 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag sign
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}notyetvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
@@ -178,7 +181,8 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag sign
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}timeboxedvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
 '
@@ -187,7 +191,8 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag sign
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}timeboxedinvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 0/9] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:52:56

changes since v5:
 - moved the fixes to existing test to the first two commits and merged
   those fixing new tests into the corresponding commit

changes since v4:
 - removed unneccessary io redir in merge-msg tests
 - added grep for merged tag to gpgssh merge-msg tests

changes since v3:
 - improve readability of prereq setup code by using heredoc and some
   variables

changes since v2:
 - fix swich/case indentation
 - BUG() on unknown payload types
 - improve test prereq by actually validating ssh-keygen functionality

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can
   extend
   this later.

Fabian Stelzer (9):
  t/fmt-merge-msg: do not redirect stderr
  t/fmt-merge-msg: make gpgssh tests more specific
  ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
  ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
  ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
  ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

 Documentation/config/gpg.txt     |  5 ++
 builtin/receive-pack.c           |  6 ++-
 commit.c                         |  6 ++-
 fmt-merge-msg.c                  |  5 +-
 gpg-interface.c                  | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 gpg-interface.h                  | 15 ++++--
 log-tree.c                       | 10 ++--
 t/lib-gpg.sh                     | 62 ++++++++++++++++++----
 t/t4202-log.sh                   | 43 +++++++++++++++
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh         | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 +++++++++++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh     | 42 +++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  5 +-
 13 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

Range-diff against v5:
 -:  ---------- >  1:  0b3848d23b t/fmt-merge-msg: do not redirect stderr
 -:  ---------- >  2:  f29d838574 t/fmt-merge-msg: make gpgssh tests more specific
 1:  c4447d30f2 =  3:  b065dcb7fb ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
 2:  0bb1617529 =  4:  c37d33db31 ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
 3:  f60bd1efd0 =  5:  640e9a4a99 ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
 4:  5fc0ad5c37 =  6:  2e98307c18 ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
 5:  f1c225871f =  7:  75d213ab15 ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
 6:  1cbd4dbb6b !  8:  498821af14 ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime
    @@ t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh: test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local
     +	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
     +	git checkout main &&
     +	git fetch . expired-signed &&
    -+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
    ++	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
    ++	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}expired-signed${apos}" actual &&
     +	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
     +'
     +
    @@ t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh: test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local
     +	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
     +	git checkout main &&
     +	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
    -+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
    ++	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
    ++	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}notyetvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
     +	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
     +'
     +
    @@ t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh: test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local
     +	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
     +	git checkout main &&
     +	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
    -+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
    ++	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
    ++	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}timeboxedvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
     +	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
     +	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
     +'
    @@ t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh: test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local
     +	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
     +	git checkout main &&
     +	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
    -+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
    ++	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
    ++	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}timeboxedinvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
     +	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
     +'
     +
 7:  d60f4ec82c =  9:  0816dd2ec8 ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 2/9] t/fmt-merge-msg: make gpgssh tests more specific

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:52:57

Some GPGSSH fmt-merge-msg tests were only grepping for failed/successful
signature validation and not checking for the tag in the resulting merge
message. Add the missing grep for it.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index cc68bba064..eb2a9a4a78 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by good ssh key
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-good-ssh-tag &&
 	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}signed-good-ssh-tag${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
 '
@@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-untrusted-ssh-tag &&
 	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}signed-untrusted-ssh-tag${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 1/9] t/fmt-merge-msg: do not redirect stderr

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:52:59

All the GPG and GPGSSH tests are redirecing stdout as well as stderr
to `actual` and grep for success/failure over the resulting file.
However, no output is printed on stderr and we do not need to
include it in the grep.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index 06c5fb5615..cc68bba064 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 test_expect_success GPG 'message for merging local tag signed by good key' '
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-good-tag &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
 	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}signed-good-tag${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "^# gpg: Signature made" actual &&
 	grep "^# gpg: Good signature from" actual
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ test_expect_success GPG 'message for merging local tag signed by good key' '
 test_expect_success GPG 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown key' '
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-good-tag &&
-	GNUPGHOME=. git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	GNUPGHOME=. git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
 	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}signed-good-tag${apos}" actual &&
 	grep "^# gpg: Signature made" actual &&
 	grep -E "^# gpg: Can${apos}t check signature: (public key not found|No public key)" actual
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by good ssh key
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-good-ssh-tag &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
 '
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git checkout main &&
 	git fetch . signed-untrusted-ssh-tag &&
-	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED}" actual &&
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 3/9] ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:53:00

To be able to extend the payload metadata with things like its creation
timestamp or the creators ident we remove the payload parameters to
check_signature() and use the already existing sigc->payload field
instead, only adding the length field to the struct. This also allows
us to get rid of the xmemdupz() calls in the verify functions. Since
sigc is now used to input data as well as output the result move it to
the front of the function list.

 - Add payload_length to struct signature_check
 - Populate sigc.payload/payload_len on all call sites
 - Remove payload parameters to check_signature()
 - Remove payload parameters to internal verify_* functions and use sigc
   instead
 - Remove xmemdupz() used for verbose output since payload is now already
   populated.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 builtin/receive-pack.c |  6 ++++--
 commit.c               |  5 +++--
 fmt-merge-msg.c        |  4 ++--
 gpg-interface.c        | 37 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
 gpg-interface.h        |  6 +++---
 log-tree.c             |  8 ++++----
 tag.c                  |  4 ++--
 7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c
index 49b846d960..61ab63c2ea 100644
--- a/builtin/receive-pack.c
+++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c
@@ -769,8 +769,10 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
 		memset(&sigcheck, '\0', sizeof(sigcheck));
 
 		bogs = parse_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len);
-		check_signature(push_cert.buf, bogs, push_cert.buf + bogs,
-				push_cert.len - bogs, &sigcheck);
+		sigcheck.payload = xmemdupz(push_cert.buf, bogs);
+		sigcheck.payload_len = bogs;
+		check_signature(&sigcheck, push_cert.buf + bogs,
+				push_cert.len - bogs);
 
 		nonce_status = check_nonce(push_cert.buf, bogs);
 	}
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 551de4903c..64e040a99b 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1212,8 +1212,9 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-		signature.len, sigc);
+
+	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
  out:
 	strbuf_release(&payload);
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index 5216191488..deca1ea3a3 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
-			if (check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, sig.buf,
-					    sig.len, &sigc) &&
+			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
 				strbuf_addstr(&sig, "gpg verification failed.\n");
 			else
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 3e7255a2a9..75ab6faacb 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ struct gpg_format {
 	const char **verify_args;
 	const char **sigs;
 	int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 	int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ static const char *ssh_sigs[] = {
 };
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);
@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -343,14 +343,13 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		     NULL);
 
 	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, &gpg_stdout, 0,
+	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, &gpg_stdout, 0,
 			   &gpg_stderr, 0);
 	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
 	delete_tempfile(&temp);
 
 	ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL);
 	sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL);
 
@@ -426,8 +425,8 @@ static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
@@ -480,7 +479,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
 			     NULL);
-		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 
 		/*
@@ -526,7 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			}
 
 			sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 					   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 			sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
@@ -540,7 +539,6 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		}
 	}
 
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 	/* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */
@@ -562,8 +560,8 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
-	size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc)
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
 	struct gpg_format *fmt;
 	int status;
@@ -575,8 +573,7 @@ int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
-	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, payload, plen, signature,
-					   slen);
+	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
 		return !!status;
@@ -593,7 +590,7 @@ void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags)
 							    sigc->output;
 
 	if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload)
-		fputs(sigc->payload, stdout);
+		fwrite(sigc->payload, 1, sigc->payload_len, stdout);
 
 	if (output)
 		fputs(output, stderr);
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index beefacbb1e..5ee7d8b6b9 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
+	size_t payload_len;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
@@ -70,9 +71,8 @@ const char *get_signing_key(void);
  * Either a GPG KeyID or a SSH Key Fingerprint
  */
 const char *get_signing_key_id(void);
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen,
-		    const char *signature, size_t slen,
-		    struct signature_check *sigc);
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen);
 void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc,
 			    unsigned flags);
 
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index 644893fd8c..a46cf60e1e 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				 signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
 		show_sig_lines(opt, status, "No signature\n");
 	else
@@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
-		status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len,
-					 signature.buf, signature.len, &sigc);
+		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
 			strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.output);
 		else
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 3e18a41841..62fb09f5a5 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
 	if (!(flags & GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS))
 		print_signature_buffer(&sigc, flags);
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 4/9] ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:53:08

if ssh-keygen supports -Overify-time, add test keys marked as expired,
not yet valid and valid both within the test_tick timeframe and outside of it.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index a3f285f515..fc03c8f89b 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ test_lazy_prereq RFC1991 '
 GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY="${GNUPGHOME}/ed25519_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY="${GNUPGHOME}/rsa_2048_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED="${GNUPGHOME}/untrusted_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED="${GNUPGHOME}/expired_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/notyetvalid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_valid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_invalid_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE="${GNUPGHOME}/protected_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE="super_secret"
 GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS="${GNUPGHOME}/ssh.all_valid.allowedSignersFile"
@@ -119,7 +123,20 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+'
+
+test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
+	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
+	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 5/9] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:53:09

If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the
allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at
the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and
revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits.
This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply
ignore this flag and use the current time.
Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a
bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8.

Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature.
However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able
to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later.
Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it
from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the
payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct.

 - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct
   signature_check
 - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the
   payload type
 - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all
   ssh-keygen verification calls
 - Set the payload type when verifying commits
 - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date
   outside of key validity as well as within

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 Documentation/config/gpg.txt |  5 ++++
 commit.c                     |  1 +
 gpg-interface.c              | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 gpg-interface.h              |  9 ++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 110 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
index 4f30c7dbdd..c9be554c73 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file
 in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree.
 This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring.
 +
+Since OpensSSH 8.8 this file allows specifying a key lifetime using valid-after &
+valid-before options. Git will mark signatures as valid if the signing key was
+valid at the time of the signatures creation. This allows users to change a
+signing key without invalidating all previously made signatures.
++
 Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option
 (see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid.
 
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 64e040a99b..a348f085b2 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc->payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 75ab6faacb..330cfc5845 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c
@@ -439,6 +439,13 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf verify_time = STRBUF_INIT;
+	const struct date_mode verify_date_mode = {
+		.type = DATE_STRFTIME,
+		.strftime_fmt = "%Y%m%d%H%M%S",
+		/* SSH signing key validity has no timezone information - Use the local timezone */
+		.local = 1,
+	};
 
 	if (!ssh_allowed_signers) {
 		error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification"));
@@ -456,11 +463,16 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (sigc->payload_timestamp)
+		strbuf_addf(&verify_time, "-Overify-time=%s",
+			show_date(sigc->payload_timestamp, 0, &verify_date_mode));
+
 	/* Find the principal from the signers */
 	strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program,
 		     "-Y", "find-principals",
 		     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 		     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+		     verify_time.buf,
 		     NULL);
 	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0,
 			   &ssh_principals_err, 0);
@@ -478,6 +490,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-Y", "check-novalidate",
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+			     verify_time.buf,
 			     NULL);
 		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
@@ -512,6 +525,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 				     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 				     "-I", principal,
 				     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+				     verify_time.buf,
 				     NULL);
 
 			if (ssh_revocation_file) {
@@ -556,10 +570,46 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
+	strbuf_release(&verify_time);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch (sigc->payload_type) {
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+		signer_header = "committer";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+		signer_header = "tagger";
+		break;
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED:
+	case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT:
+		/* Ignore payloads we don't want to parse */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		BUG("invalid value for sigc->payload_type");
+	}
+
+	ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len);
+	if (!ident_line || !ident_len)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (split_ident_line(&ident, ident_line, ident_len))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!sigc->payload_timestamp && ident.date_begin && ident.date_end)
+		sigc->payload_timestamp = parse_timestamp(ident.date_begin, NULL, 10);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
@@ -573,6 +623,9 @@ int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
+	if (parse_payload_metadata(sigc))
+		return 1;
+
 	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index 5ee7d8b6b9..b30cbdcd3d 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h
@@ -15,9 +15,18 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 	TRUST_ULTIMATE,
 };
 
+enum payload_type {
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT,
+};
+
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
 	size_t payload_len;
+	enum payload_type payload_type;
+	timestamp_t payload_timestamp;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;
 
diff --git a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
index badf3ed320..dae76ded0c 100755
--- a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
@@ -76,6 +76,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed commits' '
 	git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.mintrustlevel UNDEFINED &&
@@ -122,6 +139,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits failure on untrusted signature'
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit succeeds with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-commit timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits success with matching minTrustLevel' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.minTrustLevel fully &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 6/9] ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:53:11

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling git log.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 log-tree.c     |  2 ++
 t/t4202-log.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index a46cf60e1e..d3e7a40b64 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
@@ -583,6 +584,7 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
+		sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t4202-log.sh b/t/t4202-log.sh
index 7884e3d46b..ba855ec893 100755
--- a/t/t4202-log.sh
+++ b/t/t4202-log.sh
@@ -1677,6 +1677,24 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'setup sshkey signed branch' '
 	git commit -S -m signed_commit
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSM 'log x509 fingerprint' '
 	echo "F8BF62E0693D0694816377099909C779FA23FD65 | " >expect &&
 	git log -n1 --format="%GF | %GP" signed-x509 >actual &&
@@ -1714,6 +1732,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log --graph --show-signature ssh' '
 	grep "${GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 expired-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 notyetvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log show success with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedvalid-signed >actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedinvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPG 'log --graph --show-signature for merged tag' '
 	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" &&
 	git checkout -b plain main &&
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 7/9] ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:53:12

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling verify-tag.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
index 06c9dd6c93..1cb36b9ab8 100755
--- a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
@@ -48,6 +48,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed tags ssh' '
 	git tag -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m eighth eighth-signed-alt
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	(
@@ -80,6 +97,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag succeeds with tag date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-tag timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag failes with tag date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged ssh signature' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git cat-file tag seventh-signed >raw &&
diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 62fb09f5a5..dfbcd7fcc2 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 8/9] ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:53:13

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when generating merge messages to
verify merged tags signatures key lifetimes.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 fmt-merge-msg.c          |  1 +
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index deca1ea3a3..e4f7810be2 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
+			sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index eb2a9a4a78..6e10a539ce 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
@@ -91,6 +91,26 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'created ssh signed commit and tag' '
 	git tag -s -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m signed-ssh-tag-msg-untrusted signed-untrusted-ssh-tag left
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	git checkout -b signed-expiry-ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos}" >expected &&
 
@@ -139,6 +159,44 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by expired ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . expired-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}expired-signed${apos}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by not yet valid ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}notyetvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by valid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}timeboxedvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by invalid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual &&
+	grep "^Merge tag ${apos}timeboxedinvalid-signed${apos}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging external branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos} of $(pwd)" >expected &&
 
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v6 9/9] ssh signing: verify ssh-keygen in test prereq

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-09 08:53:15

Do a full ssh signing, find-principals and verify operation in the test
prereq's to make sure ssh-keygen works as expected. Only generating the
keys and verifying its presence is not sufficient in some situations.
One example was ssh-keygen creating unusable ssh keys in cygwin because
of unsafe default permissions for the key files. The other a broken
openssh 8.7 that segfaulted on any find-principals operation. This
extended prereq check avoids future test breakages in case ssh-keygen or
any environment behaviour changes.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index fc03c8f89b..3fadfcb306 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh
@@ -109,34 +109,61 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo $ssh_version | grep -q "find-principals:missing signature file"
 	test $? = 0 || exit 1;
 
-	# some broken versions of ssh-keygen segfault on find-principals;
-	# avoid testing with them.
-	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f /dev/null -s /dev/null
-	test $? = 139 && exit 1
-
+	# Setup some keys and an allowed signers file
 	mkdir -p "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	chmod 0700 "${GNUPGHOME}" &&
 	(setfacl -k "${GNUPGHOME}" 2>/dev/null || true) &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 1\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -N "" -C "git rsa2048 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null &&
+
+	cat >"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
+	"principal with number 1" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 2" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")"
+	"principal with number 3" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")"
+	EOF
+
+	# Verify if at least one key and ssh-keygen works as expected
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY}" >gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig &&
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with number 1" -s gpgssh_prereq.sig
 '
 
 test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
 	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
 	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+
+	# Set up keys with key lifetimes
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_valid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_invalid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	key_expired=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub") &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
-	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
+	key_notyetvalid=$(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub") &&
+
+	# Timestamps outside of test_tick span
+	ts2005a=20050401000000 ts2005b=200504020000 &&
+	# Timestamps within test_tick span
+	ts2005c=20050407000000 ts2005d=200504100000 &&
+	# Definitely not yet valid / expired timestamps
+	ts2000=20000101000000 ts2999=29990101000000 &&
+
+	cat >>"${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" <<-EOF &&
+	"timeboxed valid key" valid-after="$ts2005c",valid-before="$ts2005d" $key_valid"
+	"timeboxed invalid key" valid-after="$ts2005a",valid-before="$ts2005b" $key_invalid"
+	"principal with expired key" valid-before="$ts2000" $key_expired"
+	"principal with not yet valid key" valid-after="$ts2999" $key_notyetvalid"
+	EOF
+
+	# and verify ssh-keygen verifies the key lifetime
+	echo "testpayload" |
+	ssh-keygen -Y sign -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig &&
+	! (ssh-keygen -Y verify -n "git" -f "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" -I "principal with expired key" -s gpgssh_verifytime_prereq.sig)
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {
-- 
2.31.1
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