[PATCH v2 0/6] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

STALE1757d

Revision v2 of 7 in this series.

12 messages, 2 authors, 2021-11-04 · open the first message on its own page

[PATCH v2 0/6] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 08:06:22

This series adds key lifetime validity checks by parsing commit/tag
dates from the paylod and passing them to the ssh-keygen operations.

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can extend
   this later.

Since the last 3 patches now only contain a minimal code change and the
tests for the seperate callers we could merge them together. I don't
mind either way.

Fabian Stelzer (6):
  ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
  ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
  ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
  ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

 Documentation/config/gpg.txt     |  5 ++
 builtin/receive-pack.c           |  6 ++-
 commit.c                         |  6 ++-
 fmt-merge-msg.c                  |  5 +-
 gpg-interface.c                  | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 gpg-interface.h                  | 15 ++++--
 log-tree.c                       | 10 ++--
 t/lib-gpg.sh                     | 19 ++++++-
 t/t4202-log.sh                   | 43 ++++++++++++++++
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh         | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 +++++++++++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh     | 42 +++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  5 +-
 13 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)


base-commit: e9e5ba39a78c8f5057262d49e261b42a8660d5b9
-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v2 1/6] ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 08:06:23

To be able to extend the payload metadata with things like its creation
timestamp or the creators ident we remove the payload parameters to
check_signature() and use the already existing sigc->payload field
instead, only adding the length field to the struct. This also allows
us to get rid of the xmemdupz() calls in the verify functions. Since
sigc is now used to input data as well as output the result move it to
the front of the function list.

 - Add payload_length to struct signature_check
 - Populate sigc.payload/payload_len on all call sites
 - Remove payload parameters to check_signature()
 - Remove payload parameters to internal verify_* functions and use sigc
   instead
 - Remove xmemdupz() used for verbose output since payload is now already
   populated.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 builtin/receive-pack.c |  6 ++++--
 commit.c               |  5 +++--
 fmt-merge-msg.c        |  4 ++--
 gpg-interface.c        | 37 +++++++++++++++++--------------------
 gpg-interface.h        |  6 +++---
 log-tree.c             |  8 ++++----
 tag.c                  |  4 ++--
 7 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c
index 49b846d960..61ab63c2ea 100644
--- a/builtin/receive-pack.c
+++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c

@@ -769,8 +769,10 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
 		memset(&sigcheck, '\0', sizeof(sigcheck));
 
 		bogs = parse_signed_buffer(push_cert.buf, push_cert.len);
-		check_signature(push_cert.buf, bogs, push_cert.buf + bogs,
-				push_cert.len - bogs, &sigcheck);
+		sigcheck.payload = xmemdupz(push_cert.buf, bogs);
+		sigcheck.payload_len = bogs;
+		check_signature(&sigcheck, push_cert.buf + bogs,
+				push_cert.len - bogs);
 
 		nonce_status = check_nonce(push_cert.buf, bogs);
 	}

diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 551de4903c..64e040a99b 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c

@@ -1212,8 +1212,9 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-		signature.len, sigc);
+
+	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
  out:
 	strbuf_release(&payload);

diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index 5216191488..deca1ea3a3 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c

@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
-			if (check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, sig.buf,
-					    sig.len, &sigc) &&
+			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)
 				strbuf_addstr(&sig, "gpg verification failed.\n");
 			else

diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 800d8caa67..760cf136db 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ struct gpg_format {
 	const char **verify_args;
 	const char **sigs;
 	int (*verify_signed_buffer)(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 	int (*sign_buffer)(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);

@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ static const char *ssh_sigs[] = {
 };
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size);
 static int sign_buffer_gpg(struct strbuf *buffer, struct strbuf *signature,
 			   const char *signing_key);

@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ static void parse_gpg_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process gpg = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;

@@ -343,14 +343,13 @@ static int verify_gpg_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		     NULL);
 
 	sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, payload, payload_size, &gpg_stdout, 0,
+	ret = pipe_command(&gpg, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len, &gpg_stdout, 0,
 			   &gpg_stderr, 0);
 	sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
 
 	delete_tempfile(&temp);
 
 	ret |= !strstr(gpg_stdout.buf, "\n[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ");
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	sigc->output = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stderr, NULL);
 	sigc->gpg_status = strbuf_detach(&gpg_stdout, NULL);

@@ -424,8 +423,8 @@ static void parse_ssh_output(struct signature_check *sigc)
 }
 
 static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
-				    struct gpg_format *fmt, const char *payload,
-				    size_t payload_size, const char *signature,
+				    struct gpg_format *fmt,
+				    const char *signature,
 				    size_t signature_size)
 {
 	struct child_process ssh_keygen = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;

@@ -478,7 +477,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
 			     NULL);
-		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 
 		/*

@@ -524,7 +523,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			}
 
 			sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
-			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, payload, payload_size,
+			ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 					   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 			sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);

@@ -538,7 +537,6 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		}
 	}
 
-	sigc->payload = xmemdupz(payload, payload_size);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_out, 0);
 	strbuf_stripspace(&ssh_keygen_err, 0);
 	/* Add stderr outputs to show the user actual ssh-keygen errors */

@@ -560,8 +558,8 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
-	size_t slen, struct signature_check *sigc)
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {
 	struct gpg_format *fmt;
 	int status;

@@ -573,8 +571,7 @@ int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen, const char *signature,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
-	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, payload, plen, signature,
-					   slen);
+	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)
 		return !!status;

@@ -591,7 +588,7 @@ void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc, unsigned flags)
 							    sigc->output;
 
 	if (flags & GPG_VERIFY_VERBOSE && sigc->payload)
-		fputs(sigc->payload, stdout);
+		fwrite(sigc->payload, 1, sigc->payload_len, stdout);
 
 	if (output)
 		fputs(output, stderr);

diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index beefacbb1e..5ee7d8b6b9 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
+	size_t payload_len;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;

@@ -70,9 +71,8 @@ const char *get_signing_key(void);
  * Either a GPG KeyID or a SSH Key Fingerprint
  */
 const char *get_signing_key_id(void);
-int check_signature(const char *payload, size_t plen,
-		    const char *signature, size_t slen,
-		    struct signature_check *sigc);
+int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
+		    const char *signature, size_t slen);
 void print_signature_buffer(const struct signature_check *sigc,
 			    unsigned flags);

diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index 644893fd8c..a46cf60e1e 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c

@@ -513,8 +513,8 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				 signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)
 		show_sig_lines(opt, status, "No signature\n");
 	else

@@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
-		status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len,
-					 signature.buf, signature.len, &sigc);
+		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)
 			strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.output);
 		else

diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 3e18a41841..62fb09f5a5 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c

@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
-	ret = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
-				signature.len, &sigc);
+	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
+	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 
 	if (!(flags & GPG_VERIFY_OMIT_STATUS))
 		print_signature_buffer(&sigc, flags);

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v2 2/6] ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 08:06:26

if ssh-keygen supports -Overify-time, add test keys marked as expired,
not yet valid and valid both within the test_tick timeframe and outside of it.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/lib-gpg.sh | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/t/lib-gpg.sh b/t/lib-gpg.sh
index f99ef3e859..139e7a45ea 100644
--- a/t/lib-gpg.sh
+++ b/t/lib-gpg.sh

@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ test_lazy_prereq RFC1991 '
 GPGSSH_KEY_PRIMARY="${GNUPGHOME}/ed25519_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY="${GNUPGHOME}/rsa_2048_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED="${GNUPGHOME}/untrusted_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED="${GNUPGHOME}/expired_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/notyetvalid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_valid_ssh_signing_key"
+GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID="${GNUPGHOME}/timeboxed_invalid_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE="${GNUPGHOME}/protected_ssh_signing_key"
 GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE="super_secret"
 GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS="${GNUPGHOME}/ssh.all_valid.allowedSignersFile"

@@ -112,7 +116,20 @@ test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH '
 	echo "\"principal with number 2\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_SECONDARY}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "${GPGSSH_KEY_PASSPHRASE}" -C "git ed25519 encrypted key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}" >/dev/null &&
 	echo "\"principal with number 3\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_WITH_PASSPHRASE}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
-	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "git ed25519 key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" >/dev/null
+'
+
+test_lazy_prereq GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME '
+	# Check if ssh-keygen has a verify-time option by passing an invalid date to it
+	ssh-keygen -Overify-time=INVALID -Y check-novalidate -s doesnotmatter 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Invalid \"verify-time\"" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed valid key\" valid-after=\"20050407000000\",valid-before=\"200504100000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "timeboxed invalid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"timeboxed invalid key\" valid-after=\"20050401000000\",valid-before=\"20050402000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "expired key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with expired key\" valid-before=\"20000101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -N "" -C "not yet valid key" -f "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" >/dev/null &&
+	echo "\"principal with not yet valid key\" valid-after=\"29990101000000\" $(cat "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}.pub")" >> "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}"
 '
 
 sanitize_pgp() {

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v2 3/6] ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 08:06:31

If valid-before/after dates are configured for this signatures key in the
allowedSigners file then the verification should check if the key was valid at
the time the commit was made. This allows for graceful key rollover and
revoking keys without invalidating all previous commits.
This feature needs openssh > 8.8. Older ssh-keygen versions will simply
ignore this flag and use the current time.
Strictly speaking this feature is available in 8.7, but since 8.7 has a
bug that makes it unusable in another needed call we require 8.8.

Timestamp information is present on most invocations of check_signature.
However signer ident is not. We will need the signer email / name to be able
to implement "Trust on first use" functionality later.
Since the payload contains all necessary information we can parse it
from there. The caller only needs to provide us some info about the
payload by setting payload_type in the signature_check struct.

 - Add payload_type field & enum and payload_timestamp to struct
   signature_check
 - Populate the timestamp when not already set if we know about the
   payload type
 - Pass -Overify-time={payload_timestamp} in the users timezone to all
   ssh-keygen verification calls
 - Set the payload type when verifying commits
 - Add tests for expired, not yet valid and keys having a commit date
   outside of key validity as well as within

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 Documentation/config/gpg.txt |  5 ++++
 commit.c                     |  1 +
 gpg-interface.c              | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 gpg-interface.h              |  9 +++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
index 4f30c7dbdd..c9be554c73 100644
--- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt

@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file
 in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree.
 This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring.
 +
+Since OpensSSH 8.8 this file allows specifying a key lifetime using valid-after &
+valid-before options. Git will mark signatures as valid if the signing key was
+valid at the time of the signatures creation. This allows users to change a
+signing key without invalidating all previously made signatures.
++
 Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option
 (see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid.

diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 64e040a99b..a348f085b2 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c

@@ -1213,6 +1213,7 @@ int check_commit_signature(const struct commit *commit, struct signature_check *
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc->payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc->payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc->payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);

diff --git a/gpg-interface.c b/gpg-interface.c
index 760cf136db..bb2d5b2c67 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.c
+++ b/gpg-interface.c

@@ -437,6 +437,13 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	struct strbuf ssh_principals_err = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_out = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct strbuf ssh_keygen_err = STRBUF_INIT;
+	struct strbuf verify_time = STRBUF_INIT;
+	const struct date_mode verify_date_mode = {
+		.type = DATE_STRFTIME,
+		.strftime_fmt = "%Y%m%d%H%M%S",
+		/* SSH signing key validity has no timezone information - Use the local timezone */
+		.local = 1,
+	};
 
 	if (!ssh_allowed_signers) {
 		error(_("gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile needs to be configured and exist for ssh signature verification"));

@@ -454,11 +461,16 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (sigc->payload_timestamp)
+		strbuf_addf(&verify_time, "-Overify-time=%s",
+			show_date(sigc->payload_timestamp, 0, &verify_date_mode));
+
 	/* Find the principal from the signers */
 	strvec_pushl(&ssh_keygen.args, fmt->program,
 		     "-Y", "find-principals",
 		     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 		     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+		     verify_time.buf,
 		     NULL);
 	ret = pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, NULL, 0, &ssh_principals_out, 0,
 			   &ssh_principals_err, 0);

@@ -476,6 +488,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 			     "-Y", "check-novalidate",
 			     "-n", "git",
 			     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+			     verify_time.buf,
 			     NULL);
 		pipe_command(&ssh_keygen, sigc->payload, sigc->payload_len,
 				   &ssh_keygen_out, 0, &ssh_keygen_err, 0);

@@ -510,6 +523,7 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 				     "-f", ssh_allowed_signers,
 				     "-I", principal,
 				     "-s", buffer_file->filename.buf,
+				     verify_time.buf,
 				     NULL);
 
 			if (ssh_revocation_file) {

@@ -554,10 +568,43 @@ static int verify_ssh_signed_buffer(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_principals_err);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_out);
 	strbuf_release(&ssh_keygen_err);
+	strbuf_release(&verify_time);
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int parse_payload_metadata(struct signature_check *sigc)
+{
+	const char *ident_line = NULL;
+	size_t ident_len;
+	struct ident_split ident;
+	const char *signer_header;
+
+	switch(sigc->payload_type) {
+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT:
+			signer_header = "committer";
+			break;
+		case SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG:
+			signer_header = "tagger";
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Ignore unknown payload types */
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	ident_line = find_commit_header(sigc->payload, signer_header, &ident_len);
+	if (!ident_line || !ident_len)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (split_ident_line(&ident, ident_line, ident_len))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!sigc->payload_timestamp && ident.date_begin && ident.date_end)
+		sigc->payload_timestamp = parse_timestamp(ident.date_begin, NULL, 10);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 		    const char *signature, size_t slen)
 {

@@ -571,6 +618,9 @@ int check_signature(struct signature_check *sigc,
 	if (!fmt)
 		die(_("bad/incompatible signature '%s'"), signature);
 
+	if (parse_payload_metadata(sigc))
+		return 1;
+
 	status = fmt->verify_signed_buffer(sigc, fmt, signature, slen);
 
 	if (status && !sigc->output)

diff --git a/gpg-interface.h b/gpg-interface.h
index 5ee7d8b6b9..b30cbdcd3d 100644
--- a/gpg-interface.h
+++ b/gpg-interface.h

@@ -15,9 +15,18 @@ enum signature_trust_level {
 	TRUST_ULTIMATE,
 };
 
+enum payload_type {
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_UNDEFINED,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG,
+	SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_PUSH_CERT,
+};
+
 struct signature_check {
 	char *payload;
 	size_t payload_len;
+	enum payload_type payload_type;
+	timestamp_t payload_timestamp;
 	char *output;
 	char *gpg_status;

diff --git a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
index badf3ed320..dae76ded0c 100755
--- a/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh

@@ -76,6 +76,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed commits' '
 	git tag twelfth-signed-alt $(cat oid)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.mintrustlevel UNDEFINED &&

@@ -122,6 +139,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits failure on untrusted signature'
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit succeeds with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-commit timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-commit exits failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-commit timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify-commit exits success with matching minTrustLevel' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	test_config gpg.minTrustLevel fully &&

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v2 6/6] ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 08:06:33

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when generating merge messages to
verify merged tags signatures key lifetimes.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 fmt-merge-msg.c          |  1 +
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fmt-merge-msg.c b/fmt-merge-msg.c
index deca1ea3a3..e4f7810be2 100644
--- a/fmt-merge-msg.c
+++ b/fmt-merge-msg.c

@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static void fmt_merge_msg_sigs(struct strbuf *out)
 		else {
 			buf = payload.buf;
 			len = payload.len;
+			sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 			sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 			if (check_signature(&sigc, sig.buf, sig.len) &&
 			    !sigc.output)

diff --git a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
index 06c5fb5615..2dd2423643 100755
--- a/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh
+++ b/t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh

@@ -91,6 +91,26 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'created ssh signed commit and tag' '
 	git tag -s -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m signed-ssh-tag-msg-untrusted signed-untrusted-ssh-tag left
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	git checkout -b signed-expiry-ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging local branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos}" >expected &&

@@ -137,6 +157,40 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'message for merging local tag signed by unknown ssh
 	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual &&
 	grep "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOT_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by expired ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . expired-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by not yet valid ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . notyetvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by valid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'message for merging local tag signed by invalid timeboxed ssh key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git checkout main &&
+	git fetch . timeboxedinvalid-signed &&
+	git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD >actual 2>&1 &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'message for merging external branch' '
 	echo "Merge branch ${apos}left${apos} of $(pwd)" >expected &&

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v2 4/6] ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 08:06:40

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling git log.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 log-tree.c     |  2 ++
 t/t4202-log.sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)

diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index a46cf60e1e..d3e7a40b64 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c

@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
 	if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature, the_hash_algo) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_COMMIT;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 	if (status && !sigc.output)

@@ -583,6 +584,7 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
 	status = -1;
 	if (parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len, &payload, &signature)) {
 		/* could have a good signature */
+		sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 		sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 		status = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);
 		if (sigc.output)

diff --git a/t/t4202-log.sh b/t/t4202-log.sh
index 6a650dacd6..2b12baab77 100755
--- a/t/t4202-log.sh
+++ b/t/t4202-log.sh

@@ -1626,6 +1626,24 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'setup sshkey signed branch' '
 	git commit -S -m signed_commit
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed commits with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+	touch file &&
+	git add file &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSM 'log x509 fingerprint' '
 	echo "F8BF62E0693D0694816377099909C779FA23FD65 | " >expect &&
 	git log -n1 --format="%GF | %GP" signed-x509 >actual &&

@@ -1663,6 +1681,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'log --graph --show-signature ssh' '
 	grep "${GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 expired-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 notyetvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log show success with commit date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedvalid-signed >actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'log shows failure with commit date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git log --graph --show-signature -n1 timeboxedinvalid-signed >actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPG 'log --graph --show-signature for merged tag' '
 	test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" &&
 	git checkout -b plain main &&

-- 
2.31.1

[PATCH v2 5/6] ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-27 08:06:48

Set the payload_type for check_signature() when calling verify-tag.
Implements the same tests as for verify-commit.

Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <redacted>
---
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)

diff --git a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
index 06c9dd6c93..1cb36b9ab8 100755
--- a/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh
+++ b/t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh

@@ -48,6 +48,23 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'create signed tags ssh' '
 	git tag -u"${GPGSSH_KEY_UNTRUSTED}" -m eighth eighth-signed-alt
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'create signed tags with keys having defined lifetimes' '
+	test_when_finished "test_unconfig commit.gpgsign" &&
+	test_config gpg.format ssh &&
+
+	echo expired >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m expired -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_EXPIRED}" -m expired-signed expired-signed &&
+
+	echo notyetvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m notyetvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_NOTYETVALID}" -m notyetvalid-signed notyetvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDVALID}" -m timeboxedvalid-signed timeboxedvalid-signed &&
+
+	echo timeboxedinvalid >file && test_tick && git commit -a -m timeboxedinvalid -S"${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" &&
+	git tag -s -u "${GPGSSH_KEY_TIMEBOXEDINVALID}" -m timeboxedinvalid-signed timeboxedinvalid-signed
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	(

@@ -80,6 +97,31 @@ test_expect_success GPGSSH 'verify and show ssh signatures' '
 	)
 '
 
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on expired signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag expired-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag exits failure on not yet valid signature key' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag notyetvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag succeeds with tag date and key validity matching' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	git verify-tag timeboxedvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_BAD_SIGNATURE}" actual
+'
+
+test_expect_success GPGSSH,GPGSSH_VERIFYTIME 'verify-tag failes with tag date outside of key validity' '
+	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
+	test_must_fail git verify-tag timeboxedinvalid-signed 2>actual &&
+	! grep "${GPGSSH_GOOD_SIGNATURE_TRUSTED}" actual
+'
+
 test_expect_success GPGSSH 'detect fudged ssh signature' '
 	test_config gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "${GPGSSH_ALLOWED_SIGNERS}" &&
 	git cat-file tag seventh-signed >raw &&

diff --git a/tag.c b/tag.c
index 62fb09f5a5..dfbcd7fcc2 100644
--- a/tag.c
+++ b/tag.c

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static int run_gpg_verify(const char *buf, unsigned long size, unsigned flags)
 		return error("no signature found");
 	}
 
+	sigc.payload_type = SIGNATURE_PAYLOAD_TAG;
 	sigc.payload = strbuf_detach(&payload, &sigc.payload_len);
 	ret = check_signature(&sigc, signature.buf, signature.len);

-- 
2.31.1

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Adam Dinwoodie <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-03 19:27:50

On Wed, 27 Oct 2021 at 09:06, Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] wrote:

This series adds key lifetime validity checks by parsing commit/tag
dates from the paylod and passing them to the ssh-keygen operations.

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can extend
   this later.

Since the last 3 patches now only contain a minimal code change and the
tests for the seperate callers we could merge them together. I don't
mind either way.

Fabian Stelzer (6):
  ssh signing: use sigc struct to pass payload
  ssh signing: add key lifetime test prereqs
  ssh signing: make verify-commit consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make git log verify key lifetime
  ssh signing: make verify-tag consider key lifetime
  ssh signing: make fmt-merge-msg consider key lifetime

 Documentation/config/gpg.txt     |  5 ++
 builtin/receive-pack.c           |  6 ++-
 commit.c                         |  6 ++-
 fmt-merge-msg.c                  |  5 +-
 gpg-interface.c                  | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 gpg-interface.h                  | 15 ++++--
 log-tree.c                       | 10 ++--
 t/lib-gpg.sh                     | 19 ++++++-
 t/t4202-log.sh                   | 43 ++++++++++++++++
 t/t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh         | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++
 t/t7031-verify-tag-signed-ssh.sh | 42 +++++++++++++++
 t/t7528-signed-commit-ssh.sh     | 42 +++++++++++++++
 tag.c                            |  5 +-
 13 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)


base-commit: e9e5ba39a78c8f5057262d49e261b42a8660d5b9

As part of testing v2.34-rc0 on Cygwin, I've found this patch series
is breaking t4202, t5534, and t6200.

Specifically, bisecting points to f265f2d630 (ssh signing: tests for
logs, tags & push certs, 2021-09-10) as breaking t4202 and t5534,
while responsibility for t6200 seems to be 9d12546de9 (ssh signing:
fmt-merge-msg tests & config parse, 2021-10-12).

I've not yet done any investigation into the specifics of these
failures, but I wanted to report them early so other folks could get
on with investigating as appropriate.

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-03 19:46:04

On 03.11.2021 19:27, Adam Dinwoodie wrote:

On Wed, 27 Oct 2021 at 09:06, Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

This series adds key lifetime validity checks by parsing commit/tag
dates from the paylod and passing them to the ssh-keygen operations.

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can extend
   this later.

As part of testing v2.34-rc0 on Cygwin, I've found this patch series
is breaking t4202, t5534, and t6200.

Specifically, bisecting points to f265f2d630 (ssh signing: tests for
logs, tags & push certs, 2021-09-10) as breaking t4202 and t5534,
while responsibility for t6200 seems to be 9d12546de9 (ssh signing:
fmt-merge-msg tests & config parse, 2021-10-12).

I've not yet done any investigation into the specifics of these
failures, but I wanted to report them early so other folks could get
on with investigating as appropriate.

What exactly are you testing? This patch series is not patch of the rc
and will not be in v2.34. I even have a small reroll of this for after
the release.
I assume the breaking tests are the new ones added in these commits.
What openssh version are you using? (ssh -V)
Either the feature detecion for the lifetime checks is not
working in cygwin or maybe you have the broken openssh 8.7 version.

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Adam Dinwoodie <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-04 16:32:00

On Wednesday 03 November 2021 at 08:45 pm +0100, Fabian Stelzer wrote:

On 03.11.2021 19:27, Adam Dinwoodie wrote:

quoted

On Wed, 27 Oct 2021 at 09:06, Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

This series adds key lifetime validity checks by parsing commit/tag
dates from the paylod and passing them to the ssh-keygen operations.

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can extend
   this later.

As part of testing v2.34-rc0 on Cygwin, I've found this patch series
is breaking t4202, t5534, and t6200.

Specifically, bisecting points to f265f2d630 (ssh signing: tests for
logs, tags & push certs, 2021-09-10) as breaking t4202 and t5534,
while responsibility for t6200 seems to be 9d12546de9 (ssh signing:
fmt-merge-msg tests & config parse, 2021-10-12).

I've not yet done any investigation into the specifics of these
failures, but I wanted to report them early so other folks could get
on with investigating as appropriate.

What exactly are you testing?

I was initially running the tests using the Cygwin packaging
paraphernalia, as I want to check the full build infrastructure is
working as expected.  When this failed, I reproduced the problems on a
clean checkout of the main Git repository.  In particular, I identified
the failing commits with the following bisect command (subject to
obvious modifications to select the correct script):

     git bisect start v2.34.0-rc0 v2.33.1 && git bisect run bash -c 'make -j 20 || exit 125; cd t || exit 125; ./t4202-*.sh'

This patch series is not patch of the rc
and will not be in v2.34. I even have a small reroll of this for after
the release.

That's odd. `git tag --contains 9d12546de9`, with a fresh pull of the
Git repo, lists v2.34.0-rc0 and v2.34.0-rc1.  It sounds like that's not
expected?

I assume the breaking tests are the new ones added in these commits.

For t4202-log.sh, the failing tests are "72 - setup sshkey signed
branch" and "75 - log ssh key fingerprint".

For t5534-push-signed.sh, the failing tests are "8 - ssh signed push
sends push certificate" and "12 - fail without key and heed
user.signingkey ssh".

For t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh, the failing tests are "3 - created ssh
signed commit and tag", "7 - message for merging local tag signed by
good ssh key" and "8 - message for merging local tag signed by unknown
ssh key".

What openssh version are you using? (ssh -V)

    OpenSSH_8.8p1, OpenSSL 1.1.1l  24 Aug 2021

Either the feature detecion for the lifetime checks is not
working in cygwin or maybe you have the broken openssh 8.7 version.

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Fabian Stelzer <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-04 16:55:03

On 04.11.2021 16:31, Adam Dinwoodie wrote:

On Wednesday 03 November 2021 at 08:45 pm +0100, Fabian Stelzer wrote:

quoted

On 03.11.2021 19:27, Adam Dinwoodie wrote:

quoted

On Wed, 27 Oct 2021 at 09:06, Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

This series adds key lifetime validity checks by parsing commit/tag
dates from the paylod and passing them to the ssh-keygen operations.

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can extend
   this later.

As part of testing v2.34-rc0 on Cygwin, I've found this patch series
is breaking t4202, t5534, and t6200.

Specifically, bisecting points to f265f2d630 (ssh signing: tests for
logs, tags & push certs, 2021-09-10) as breaking t4202 and t5534,
while responsibility for t6200 seems to be 9d12546de9 (ssh signing:
fmt-merge-msg tests & config parse, 2021-10-12).

Ok, i should have read this closer / checked the commit. The commit you are
referring to is not part of 'this' patch series, but an earlier one which was
indeed merged and part of the rc.

For t4202-log.sh, the failing tests are "72 - setup sshkey signed
branch" and "75 - log ssh key fingerprint".

For t5534-push-signed.sh, the failing tests are "8 - ssh signed push
sends push certificate" and "12 - fail without key and heed
user.signingkey ssh".

For t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh, the failing tests are "3 - created ssh
signed commit and tag", "7 - message for merging local tag signed by
good ssh key" and "8 - message for merging local tag signed by unknown
ssh key".

Could you send the full output of these tests directly to me?
Best would be sth like the full output of
"GIT_TRACE=1 sh t4202-log.sh -vx"
and maybe for one test with the trash directory in a zip file (just run
the test with -vix, it will stop at the first failure and leave the test
files in place)

I don't have much experience on windows (especially not cygwin) but
maybe i can spot the problem.

quoted

What openssh version are you using? (ssh -V)

   OpenSSH_8.8p1, OpenSSL 1.1.1l  24 Aug 2021

That should be recent enough for this to work.

Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] ssh signing: verify key lifetime

From: Adam Dinwoodie <hidden>
Date: 2021-11-04 17:24:06

On Thursday 04 November 2021 at 05:54 pm +0100, Fabian Stelzer wrote:

On 04.11.2021 16:31, Adam Dinwoodie wrote:

quoted

On Wednesday 03 November 2021 at 08:45 pm +0100, Fabian Stelzer wrote:

quoted

On 03.11.2021 19:27, Adam Dinwoodie wrote:

quoted

On Wed, 27 Oct 2021 at 09:06, Fabian Stelzer [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

This series adds key lifetime validity checks by parsing commit/tag
dates from the paylod and passing them to the ssh-keygen operations.

changes since v1:
 - struct signature_check is now used to input payload data into
   check_function
 - payload metadata parsing is completely internal to check_signature.
   the caller only need to set the payload type in the sigc struct
 - small nits and readability fixes
 - removed payload_signer parameter. since we now use the struct we can extend
   this later.

As part of testing v2.34-rc0 on Cygwin, I've found this patch series
is breaking t4202, t5534, and t6200.

Specifically, bisecting points to f265f2d630 (ssh signing: tests for
logs, tags & push certs, 2021-09-10) as breaking t4202 and t5534,
while responsibility for t6200 seems to be 9d12546de9 (ssh signing:
fmt-merge-msg tests & config parse, 2021-10-12).

Ok, i should have read this closer / checked the commit. The commit you are
referring to is not part of 'this' patch series, but an earlier one which was
indeed merged and part of the rc.

Ah!  That's at least in part on me then; I'd found the most recent
thread that looked like it was related to this patch series, and assumed
it'd be the one that was included, without checking the actual commit
contents.  Apologies!

quoted

For t4202-log.sh, the failing tests are "72 - setup sshkey signed
branch" and "75 - log ssh key fingerprint".

For t5534-push-signed.sh, the failing tests are "8 - ssh signed push
sends push certificate" and "12 - fail without key and heed
user.signingkey ssh".

For t6200-fmt-merge-msg.sh, the failing tests are "3 - created ssh
signed commit and tag", "7 - message for merging local tag signed by
good ssh key" and "8 - message for merging local tag signed by unknown
ssh key".

Could you send the full output of these tests directly to me?
Best would be sth like the full output of
"GIT_TRACE=1 sh t4202-log.sh -vx"
and maybe for one test with the trash directory in a zip file (just run
the test with -vix, it will stop at the first failure and leave the test
files in place)

I don't have much experience on windows (especially not cygwin) but
maybe i can spot the problem.

I'll send these to you shortly.

I don't have much experience with any of Git's signing functions, so
perhaps between us we might be able to get somewhere :)

quoted

What openssh version are you using? (ssh -V)

   OpenSSH_8.8p1, OpenSSL 1.1.1l  24 Aug 2021

That should be recent enough for this to work.

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