Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] transport: add from_user parameter to is_transport_allowed

9 messages, 2 authors, 2016-12-06 · open the first message on its own page

Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] transport: add from_user parameter to is_transport_allowed

From: Junio C Hamano <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 17:54:02

Jeff King [off-list ref] writes:
I don't know if that makes things any easier. I feel funny saying "no,
no, mine preempts yours because it is more maint-worthy", but I think
that order does make sense.

I think it would be OK to put Brandon's on maint, too, though. It is a
refactor of an existing security feature to make it more featureful, but
the way it is implemented could not cause security regressions unless
you use the new feature (IOW, we still respect the whitelist environment
exactly as before).
I think I merged yours and then Brandon's on jch/pu branches in that
order, and the conflict resolution should look OK.

I however forked yours on v2.11.0-rc1, which would need to be
rebased to one of the earlier maintenance tracks, before we can
merge it to 'next'.

Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] transport: add from_user parameter to is_transport_allowed

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:10:17

On Tue, Dec 06, 2016 at 09:53:53AM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote:
Jeff King [off-list ref] writes:
quoted
I don't know if that makes things any easier. I feel funny saying "no,
no, mine preempts yours because it is more maint-worthy", but I think
that order does make sense.

I think it would be OK to put Brandon's on maint, too, though. It is a
refactor of an existing security feature to make it more featureful, but
the way it is implemented could not cause security regressions unless
you use the new feature (IOW, we still respect the whitelist environment
exactly as before).
I think I merged yours and then Brandon's on jch/pu branches in that
order, and the conflict resolution should look OK.

I however forked yours on v2.11.0-rc1, which would need to be
rebased to one of the earlier maintenance tracks, before we can
merge it to 'next'.
Yeah, I built it on top of master.

It does depend on some of the http-walker changes Eric made a few months
ago. In particular, 17966c0a6 (http: avoid disconnecting on 404s for
loose objects, 2016-07-11) added some checks against the HTTP status
code, and my series modifies the checks (mostly so that ">= 400" becomes
">= 300").

Rebasing on maint-2.9 means omitting those changes. That preserves the
security properties, but means that the error handling is worse when we
see an illegal redirect. That may be OK, though.

Since the resolution is to omit the changes entirely from my series,
merging up to v2.11 wouldn't produce any conflicts. We'd need to have a
separate set of patches adding those changes back in.

-Peff

[PATCH v2] jk/http-walker-limit-redirect rebased to maint-2.9

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:31:32

On Tue, Dec 06, 2016 at 01:10:08PM -0500, Jeff King wrote:
quoted
I think I merged yours and then Brandon's on jch/pu branches in that
order, and the conflict resolution should look OK.

I however forked yours on v2.11.0-rc1, which would need to be
rebased to one of the earlier maintenance tracks, before we can
merge it to 'next'.
Yeah, I built it on top of master.

It does depend on some of the http-walker changes Eric made a few months
ago. In particular, 17966c0a6 (http: avoid disconnecting on 404s for
loose objects, 2016-07-11) added some checks against the HTTP status
code, and my series modifies the checks (mostly so that ">= 400" becomes
">= 300").

Rebasing on maint-2.9 means omitting those changes. That preserves the
security properties, but means that the error handling is worse when we
see an illegal redirect. That may be OK, though.

Since the resolution is to omit the changes entirely from my series,
merging up to v2.11 wouldn't produce any conflicts. We'd need to have a
separate set of patches adding those changes back in.
This actually turned out to be pretty easy. The final patch from my
original series is the one that tweaks the error-handling from
17966c0a6. The rest of them are _almost_ untouched, except that one of
the error-handling tweaks gets bumped to the final patch.

So here's a resend of the patches, rebased on your maint-2.9 branch.
Patches 1-5 should be applied directly there.

On maint-2.10, you can merge up maint-2.9, and then apply patch 6.

Hopefully that makes sense, but I've pushed branches
jk/maint-X-http-redirect to https://github.com/peff/git that show the
final configuration (and a diff of jk/maint-2.10-http-redirect shows the
outcome is identical to applying the original series on top of 2.10).

Merging up to 2.11 should be trivial.

  [1/6]: http: simplify update_url_from_redirect
  [2/6]: http: always update the base URL for redirects
  [3/6]: remote-curl: rename shadowed options variable
  [4/6]: http: make redirects more obvious
  [5/6]: http: treat http-alternates like redirects
  [6/6]: http-walker: complain about non-404 loose object errors

-Peff

[PATCH v2 1/6] http: simplify update_url_from_redirect

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:25:37

This function looks for a common tail between what we asked
for and where we were redirected to, but it open-codes the
comparison. We can avoid some confusing subtractions by
using strip_suffix_mem().

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <redacted>
---
 http.c | 10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
index d8e427b69..d4034a14b 100644
--- a/http.c
+++ b/http.c
@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ static int update_url_from_redirect(struct strbuf *base,
 				    const struct strbuf *got)
 {
 	const char *tail;
-	size_t tail_len;
+	size_t new_len;
 
 	if (!strcmp(asked, got->buf))
 		return 0;
@@ -1509,14 +1509,12 @@ static int update_url_from_redirect(struct strbuf *base,
 		die("BUG: update_url_from_redirect: %s is not a superset of %s",
 		    asked, base->buf);
 
-	tail_len = strlen(tail);
-
-	if (got->len < tail_len ||
-	    strcmp(tail, got->buf + got->len - tail_len))
+	new_len = got->len;
+	if (!strip_suffix_mem(got->buf, &new_len, tail))
 		return 0; /* insane redirect scheme */
 
 	strbuf_reset(base);
-	strbuf_add(base, got->buf, got->len - tail_len);
+	strbuf_add(base, got->buf, new_len);
 	return 1;
 }
 
-- 
2.11.0.191.gdb26c57

[PATCH v2 3/6] remote-curl: rename shadowed options variable

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:25:40

The discover_refs() function has a local "options" variable
to hold the http_get_options we pass to http_get_strbuf().
But this shadows the global "struct options" that holds our
program-level options, which cannot be accessed from this
function.

Let's give the local one a more descriptive name so we can
tell the two apart.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <redacted>
---
 remote-curl.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/remote-curl.c b/remote-curl.c
index 6b83b7783..e3803daa3 100644
--- a/remote-curl.c
+++ b/remote-curl.c
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static struct discovery *discover_refs(const char *service, int for_push)
 	struct strbuf effective_url = STRBUF_INIT;
 	struct discovery *last = last_discovery;
 	int http_ret, maybe_smart = 0;
-	struct http_get_options options;
+	struct http_get_options http_options;
 
 	if (last && !strcmp(service, last->service))
 		return last;
@@ -271,15 +271,15 @@ static struct discovery *discover_refs(const char *service, int for_push)
 		strbuf_addf(&refs_url, "service=%s", service);
 	}
 
-	memset(&options, 0, sizeof(options));
-	options.content_type = &type;
-	options.charset = &charset;
-	options.effective_url = &effective_url;
-	options.base_url = &url;
-	options.no_cache = 1;
-	options.keep_error = 1;
+	memset(&http_options, 0, sizeof(http_options));
+	http_options.content_type = &type;
+	http_options.charset = &charset;
+	http_options.effective_url = &effective_url;
+	http_options.base_url = &url;
+	http_options.no_cache = 1;
+	http_options.keep_error = 1;
 
-	http_ret = http_get_strbuf(refs_url.buf, &buffer, &options);
+	http_ret = http_get_strbuf(refs_url.buf, &buffer, &http_options);
 	switch (http_ret) {
 	case HTTP_OK:
 		break;
-- 
2.11.0.191.gdb26c57

[PATCH v2 2/6] http: always update the base URL for redirects

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:25:44

If a malicious server redirects the initial ref
advertisement, it may be able to leak sha1s from other,
unrelated servers that the client has access to. For
example, imagine that Alice is a git user, she has access to
a private repository on a server hosted by Bob, and Mallory
runs a malicious server and wants to find out about Bob's
private repository.

Mallory asks Alice to clone an unrelated repository from her
over HTTP. When Alice's client contacts Mallory's server for
the initial ref advertisement, the server issues an HTTP
redirect for Bob's server. Alice contacts Bob's server and
gets the ref advertisement for the private repository. If
there is anything to fetch, she then follows up by asking
the server for one or more sha1 objects. But who is the
server?

If it is still Mallory's server, then Alice will leak the
existence of those sha1s to her.

Since commit c93c92f30 (http: update base URLs when we see
redirects, 2013-09-28), the client usually rewrites the base
URL such that all further requests will go to Bob's server.
But this is done by textually matching the URL. If we were
originally looking for "http://mallory/repo.git/info/refs",
and we got pointed at "http://bob/other.git/info/refs", then
we know that the right root is "http://bob/other.git".

If the redirect appears to change more than just the root,
we punt and continue to use the original server. E.g.,
imagine the redirect adds a URL component that Bob's server
will ignore, like "http://bob/other.git/info/refs?dummy=1".

We can solve this by aborting in this case rather than
silently continuing to use Mallory's server. In addition to
protecting from sha1 leakage, it's arguably safer and more
sane to refuse a confusing redirect like that in general.
For example, part of the motivation in c93c92f30 is
avoiding accidentally sending credentials over clear http,
just to get a response that says "try again over https". So
even in a non-malicious case, we'd prefer to err on the side
of caution.

The downside is that it's possible this will break a
legitimate but complicated server-side redirection scheme.
The setup given in the newly added test does work, but it's
convoluted enough that we don't need to care about it. A
more plausible case would be a server which redirects a
request for "info/refs?service=git-upload-pack" to just
"info/refs" (because it does not do smart HTTP, and for some
reason really dislikes query parameters).  Right now we
would transparently downgrade to dumb-http, but with this
patch, we'd complain (and the user would have to set
GIT_SMART_HTTP=0 to fetch).

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <redacted>
---
 http.c                        | 12 ++++++++----
 t/lib-httpd/apache.conf       |  8 ++++++++
 t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh   |  4 ++++
 t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh |  1 +
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
index d4034a14b..718d2109b 100644
--- a/http.c
+++ b/http.c
@@ -1491,9 +1491,9 @@ static int http_request(const char *url,
  *
  * Note that this assumes a sane redirect scheme. It's entirely possible
  * in the example above to end up at a URL that does not even end in
- * "info/refs".  In such a case we simply punt, as there is not much we can
- * do (and such a scheme is unlikely to represent a real git repository,
- * which means we are likely about to abort anyway).
+ * "info/refs".  In such a case we die. There's not much we can do, such a
+ * scheme is unlikely to represent a real git repository, and failing to
+ * rewrite the base opens options for malicious redirects to do funny things.
  */
 static int update_url_from_redirect(struct strbuf *base,
 				    const char *asked,
@@ -1511,10 +1511,14 @@ static int update_url_from_redirect(struct strbuf *base,
 
 	new_len = got->len;
 	if (!strip_suffix_mem(got->buf, &new_len, tail))
-		return 0; /* insane redirect scheme */
+		die(_("unable to update url base from redirection:\n"
+		      "  asked for: %s\n"
+		      "   redirect: %s"),
+		    asked, got->buf);
 
 	strbuf_reset(base);
 	strbuf_add(base, got->buf, new_len);
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
diff --git a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
index 018a83a5a..9a355fb1c 100644
--- a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
+++ b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
@@ -132,6 +132,14 @@ RewriteRule ^/ftp-redir/(.*)$ ftp://localhost:1000/$1 [R=302]
 RewriteRule ^/loop-redir/x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-(.*) /$1 [R=302]
 RewriteRule ^/loop-redir/(.*)$ /loop-redir/x-$1 [R=302]
 
+# The first rule issues a client-side redirect to something
+# that _doesn't_ look like a git repo. The second rule is a
+# server-side rewrite, so that it turns out the odd-looking
+# thing _is_ a git repo. The "[PT]" tells Apache to match
+# the usual ScriptAlias rules for /smart.
+RewriteRule ^/insane-redir/(.*)$ /intern-redir/$1/foo [R=301]
+RewriteRule ^/intern-redir/(.*)/foo$ /smart/$1 [PT]
+
 # Apache 2.2 does not understand <RequireAll>, so we use RewriteCond.
 # And as RewriteCond does not allow testing for non-matches, we match
 # the desired case first (one has abra, two has cadabra), and let it
diff --git a/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
index 2f375eb94..d8826acde 100755
--- a/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
+++ b/t/t5551-http-fetch-smart.sh
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ test_expect_success 'redirects re-root further requests' '
 	git clone $HTTPD_URL/smart-redir-limited/repo.git repo-redir-limited
 '
 
+test_expect_success 're-rooting dies on insane schemes' '
+	test_must_fail git clone $HTTPD_URL/insane-redir/repo.git insane
+'
+
 test_expect_success 'clone from password-protected repository' '
 	echo two >expect &&
 	set_askpass user@host pass@host &&
diff --git a/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
index 0d105d541..044cc152f 100755
--- a/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
+++ b/t/t5812-proto-disable-http.sh
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ test_proto "smart http" http "$HTTPD_URL/smart/repo.git"
 
 test_expect_success 'curl redirects respect whitelist' '
 	test_must_fail env GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=http:https \
+			   GIT_SMART_HTTP=0 \
 		git clone "$HTTPD_URL/ftp-redir/repo.git" 2>stderr &&
 	{
 		test_i18ngrep "ftp.*disabled" stderr ||
-- 
2.11.0.191.gdb26c57

[PATCH v2 4/6] http: make redirects more obvious

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:25:47

We instruct curl to always follow HTTP redirects. This is
convenient, but it creates opportunities for malicious
servers to create confusing situations. For instance,
imagine Alice is a git user with access to a private
repository on Bob's server. Mallory runs her own server and
wants to access objects from Bob's repository.

Mallory may try a few tricks that involve asking Alice to
clone from her, build on top, and then push the result:

  1. Mallory may simply redirect all fetch requests to Bob's
     server. Git will transparently follow those redirects
     and fetch Bob's history, which Alice may believe she
     got from Mallory. The subsequent push seems like it is
     just feeding Mallory back her own objects, but is
     actually leaking Bob's objects. There is nothing in
     git's output to indicate that Bob's repository was
     involved at all.

     The downside (for Mallory) of this attack is that Alice
     will have received Bob's entire repository, and is
     likely to notice that when building on top of it.

  2. If Mallory happens to know the sha1 of some object X in
     Bob's repository, she can instead build her own history
     that references that object. She then runs a dumb http
     server, and Alice's client will fetch each object
     individually. When it asks for X, Mallory redirects her
     to Bob's server. The end result is that Alice obtains
     objects from Bob, but they may be buried deep in
     history. Alice is less likely to notice.

Both of these attacks are fairly hard to pull off. There's a
social component in getting Mallory to convince Alice to
work with her. Alice may be prompted for credentials in
accessing Bob's repository (but not always, if she is using
a credential helper that caches). Attack (1) requires a
certain amount of obliviousness on Alice's part while making
a new commit. Attack (2) requires that Mallory knows a sha1
in Bob's repository, that Bob's server supports dumb http,
and that the object in question is loose on Bob's server.

But we can probably make things a bit more obvious without
any loss of functionality. This patch does two things to
that end.

First, when we encounter a whole-repo redirect during the
initial ref discovery, we now inform the user on stderr,
making attack (1) much more obvious.

Second, the decision to follow redirects is now
configurable. The truly paranoid can set the new
http.followRedirects to false to avoid any redirection
entirely. But for a more practical default, we will disallow
redirects only after the initial ref discovery. This is
enough to thwart attacks similar to (2), while still
allowing the common use of redirects at the repository
level. Since c93c92f30 (http: update base URLs when we see
redirects, 2013-09-28) we re-root all further requests from
the redirect destination, which should generally mean that
no further redirection is necessary.

As an escape hatch, in case there really is a server that
needs to redirect individual requests, the user can set
http.followRedirects to "true" (and this can be done on a
per-server basis via http.*.followRedirects config).

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <redacted>
---
 Documentation/config.txt   | 10 ++++++++++
 http.c                     | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 http.h                     | 10 +++++++++-
 remote-curl.c              |  4 ++++
 t/lib-httpd/apache.conf    |  6 ++++++
 t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/config.txt b/Documentation/config.txt
index f4721a048..815333643 100644
--- a/Documentation/config.txt
+++ b/Documentation/config.txt
@@ -1833,6 +1833,16 @@ http.userAgent::
 	of common USER_AGENT strings (but not including those like git/1.7.1).
 	Can be overridden by the `GIT_HTTP_USER_AGENT` environment variable.
 
+http.followRedirects::
+	Whether git should follow HTTP redirects. If set to `true`, git
+	will transparently follow any redirect issued by a server it
+	encounters. If set to `false`, git will treat all redirects as
+	errors. If set to `initial`, git will follow redirects only for
+	the initial request to a remote, but not for subsequent
+	follow-up HTTP requests. Since git uses the redirected URL as
+	the base for the follow-up requests, this is generally
+	sufficient. The default is `initial`.
+
 http.<url>.*::
 	Any of the http.* options above can be applied selectively to some URLs.
 	For a config key to match a URL, each element of the config key is
diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
index 718d2109b..b99ade5fa 100644
--- a/http.c
+++ b/http.c
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ static int http_proactive_auth;
 static const char *user_agent;
 static int curl_empty_auth;
 
+enum http_follow_config http_follow_config = HTTP_FOLLOW_INITIAL;
+
 #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071700
 /* Use CURLOPT_KEYPASSWD as is */
 #elif LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070903
@@ -337,6 +339,16 @@ static int http_options(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (!strcmp("http.followredirects", var)) {
+		if (value && !strcmp(value, "initial"))
+			http_follow_config = HTTP_FOLLOW_INITIAL;
+		else if (git_config_bool(var, value))
+			http_follow_config = HTTP_FOLLOW_ALWAYS;
+		else
+			http_follow_config = HTTP_FOLLOW_NONE;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* Fall back on the default ones */
 	return git_default_config(var, value, cb);
 }
@@ -553,7 +565,6 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
 				 curl_low_speed_time);
 	}
 
-	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);
 	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS, 20);
 #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301
 	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_POSTREDIR, CURL_REDIR_POST_ALL);
@@ -882,6 +893,16 @@ struct active_request_slot *get_active_slot(void)
 	curl_easy_setopt(slot->curl, CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, 1);
 	curl_easy_setopt(slot->curl, CURLOPT_RANGE, NULL);
 
+	/*
+	 * Default following to off unless "ALWAYS" is configured; this gives
+	 * callers a sane starting point, and they can tweak for individual
+	 * HTTP_FOLLOW_* cases themselves.
+	 */
+	if (http_follow_config == HTTP_FOLLOW_ALWAYS)
+		curl_easy_setopt(slot->curl, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);
+	else
+		curl_easy_setopt(slot->curl, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 0);
+
 #if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070a08
 	curl_easy_setopt(slot->curl, CURLOPT_IPRESOLVE, git_curl_ipresolve);
 #endif
@@ -1122,9 +1143,12 @@ static int handle_curl_result(struct slot_results *results)
 	 * If we see a failing http code with CURLE_OK, we have turned off
 	 * FAILONERROR (to keep the server's custom error response), and should
 	 * translate the code into failure here.
+	 *
+	 * Likewise, if we see a redirect (30x code), that means we turned off
+	 * redirect-following, and we should treat the result as an error.
 	 */
 	if (results->curl_result == CURLE_OK &&
-	    results->http_code >= 400) {
+	    results->http_code >= 300) {
 		results->curl_result = CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR;
 		/*
 		 * Normally curl will already have put the "reason phrase"
@@ -1443,6 +1467,9 @@ static int http_request(const char *url,
 		strbuf_addstr(&buf, " no-cache");
 	if (options && options->keep_error)
 		curl_easy_setopt(slot->curl, CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, 0);
+	if (options && options->initial_request &&
+	    http_follow_config == HTTP_FOLLOW_INITIAL)
+		curl_easy_setopt(slot->curl, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, 1);
 
 	headers = curl_slist_append(headers, buf.buf);
 
diff --git a/http.h b/http.h
index 36f558bfb..31b4cc94b 100644
--- a/http.h
+++ b/http.h
@@ -116,6 +116,13 @@ extern struct credential http_auth;
 
 extern char curl_errorstr[CURL_ERROR_SIZE];
 
+enum http_follow_config {
+	HTTP_FOLLOW_NONE,
+	HTTP_FOLLOW_ALWAYS,
+	HTTP_FOLLOW_INITIAL
+};
+extern enum http_follow_config http_follow_config;
+
 static inline int missing__target(int code, int result)
 {
 	return	/* file:// URL -- do we ever use one??? */
@@ -139,7 +146,8 @@ extern char *get_remote_object_url(const char *url, const char *hex,
 /* Options for http_get_*() */
 struct http_get_options {
 	unsigned no_cache:1,
-		 keep_error:1;
+		 keep_error:1,
+		 initial_request:1;
 
 	/* If non-NULL, returns the content-type of the response. */
 	struct strbuf *content_type;
diff --git a/remote-curl.c b/remote-curl.c
index e3803daa3..05ae8dead 100644
--- a/remote-curl.c
+++ b/remote-curl.c
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ static struct discovery *discover_refs(const char *service, int for_push)
 	http_options.charset = &charset;
 	http_options.effective_url = &effective_url;
 	http_options.base_url = &url;
+	http_options.initial_request = 1;
 	http_options.no_cache = 1;
 	http_options.keep_error = 1;
 
@@ -294,6 +295,9 @@ static struct discovery *discover_refs(const char *service, int for_push)
 		die("unable to access '%s': %s", url.buf, curl_errorstr);
 	}
 
+	if (options.verbosity && !starts_with(refs_url.buf, url.buf))
+		warning(_("redirecting to %s"), url.buf);
+
 	last= xcalloc(1, sizeof(*last_discovery));
 	last->service = service;
 	last->buf_alloc = strbuf_detach(&buffer, &last->len);
diff --git a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
index 9a355fb1c..5b408d649 100644
--- a/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
+++ b/t/lib-httpd/apache.conf
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ ScriptAlias /error/ error.sh/
 </Files>
 
 RewriteEngine on
+RewriteRule ^/dumb-redir/(.*)$ /dumb/$1 [R=301]
 RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-perm/(.*)$ /smart/$1 [R=301]
 RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-temp/(.*)$ /smart/$1 [R=302]
 RewriteRule ^/smart-redir-auth/(.*)$ /auth/smart/$1 [R=301]
@@ -140,6 +141,11 @@ RewriteRule ^/loop-redir/(.*)$ /loop-redir/x-$1 [R=302]
 RewriteRule ^/insane-redir/(.*)$ /intern-redir/$1/foo [R=301]
 RewriteRule ^/intern-redir/(.*)/foo$ /smart/$1 [PT]
 
+# Serve info/refs internally without redirecting, but
+# issue a redirect for any object requests.
+RewriteRule ^/redir-objects/(.*/info/refs)$ /dumb/$1 [PT]
+RewriteRule ^/redir-objects/(.*/objects/.*)$ /dumb/$1 [R=301]
+
 # Apache 2.2 does not understand <RequireAll>, so we use RewriteCond.
 # And as RewriteCond does not allow testing for non-matches, we match
 # the desired case first (one has abra, two has cadabra), and let it
diff --git a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
index 3484b6f0f..ad94ed7b1 100755
--- a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
+++ b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
@@ -299,5 +299,28 @@ test_expect_success 'git client does not send an empty Accept-Language' '
 	! grep "^Accept-Language:" stderr
 '
 
+test_expect_success 'redirects can be forbidden/allowed' '
+	test_must_fail git -c http.followRedirects=false \
+		clone $HTTPD_URL/dumb-redir/repo.git dumb-redir &&
+	git -c http.followRedirects=true \
+		clone $HTTPD_URL/dumb-redir/repo.git dumb-redir 2>stderr
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'redirects are reported to stderr' '
+	# just look for a snippet of the redirected-to URL
+	test_i18ngrep /dumb/ stderr
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'non-initial redirects can be forbidden' '
+	test_must_fail git -c http.followRedirects=initial \
+		clone $HTTPD_URL/redir-objects/repo.git redir-objects &&
+	git -c http.followRedirects=true \
+		clone $HTTPD_URL/redir-objects/repo.git redir-objects
+'
+
+test_expect_success 'http.followRedirects defaults to "initial"' '
+	test_must_fail git clone $HTTPD_URL/redir-objects/repo.git default
+'
+
 stop_httpd
 test_done
-- 
2.11.0.191.gdb26c57

[PATCH v2 5/6] http: treat http-alternates like redirects

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:26:19

The previous commit made HTTP redirects more obvious and
tightened up the default behavior. However, there's another
way for a server to ask a git client to fetch arbitrary
content: by having an http-alternates file (or a regular
alternates file, which is used as a backup).

Similar to the HTTP redirect case, a malicious server can
claim to have refs pointing at object X, return a 404 when
the client asks for X, but point to some other URL via
http-alternates, which the client will transparently fetch.
The end result is that it looks from the user's perspective
like the objects came from the malicious server, as the
other URL is not mentioned at all.

Worse, because we feed the new URL to curl ourselves, the
usual protocol restrictions do not kick in (neither curl's
default of disallowing file://, nor the protocol
whitelisting in f4113cac0 (http: limit redirection to
protocol-whitelist, 2015-09-22).

Let's apply the same rules here as we do for HTTP redirects.
Namely:

  - unless http.followRedirects is set to "always", we will
    not follow remote redirects from http-alternates (or
    alternates) at all

  - set CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS alongside CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS
    restrict ourselves to a known-safe set and respect any
    user-provided whitelist.

  - mention alternate object stores on stderr so that the
    user is aware another source of objects may be involved

The first item may prove to be too restrictive. The most
common use of alternates is to point to another path on the
same server. While it's possible for a single-server
redirect to be an attack, it takes a fairly obscure setup
(victim and evil repository on the same host, host speaks
dumb http, and evil repository has access to edit its own
http-alternates file).

So we could make the checks more specific, and only cover
cross-server redirects. But that means parsing the URLs
ourselves, rather than letting curl handle them. This patch
goes for the simpler approach. Given that they are only used
with dumb http, http-alternates are probably pretty rare.
And there's an escape hatch: the user can allow redirects on
a specific server by setting http.<url>.followRedirects to
"always".

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <redacted>
---
 http-walker.c              |  8 +++++---
 http.c                     |  1 +
 t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/http-walker.c b/http-walker.c
index 2c721f0c3..4bff31c44 100644
--- a/http-walker.c
+++ b/http-walker.c
@@ -290,9 +290,8 @@ static void process_alternates_response(void *callback_data)
 				struct strbuf target = STRBUF_INIT;
 				strbuf_add(&target, base, serverlen);
 				strbuf_add(&target, data + i, posn - i - 7);
-				if (walker->get_verbosely)
-					fprintf(stderr, "Also look at %s\n",
-						target.buf);
+				warning("adding alternate object store: %s",
+					target.buf);
 				newalt = xmalloc(sizeof(*newalt));
 				newalt->next = NULL;
 				newalt->base = strbuf_detach(&target, NULL);
@@ -318,6 +317,9 @@ static void fetch_alternates(struct walker *walker, const char *base)
 	struct alternates_request alt_req;
 	struct walker_data *cdata = walker->data;
 
+	if (http_follow_config != HTTP_FOLLOW_ALWAYS)
+		return;
+
 	/*
 	 * If another request has already started fetching alternates,
 	 * wait for them to arrive and return to processing this request's
diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
index b99ade5fa..a9778bfa4 100644
--- a/http.c
+++ b/http.c
@@ -581,6 +581,7 @@ static CURL *get_curl_handle(void)
 	if (is_transport_allowed("ftps"))
 		allowed_protocols |= CURLPROTO_FTPS;
 	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, allowed_protocols);
+	curl_easy_setopt(result, CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, allowed_protocols);
 #else
 	if (transport_restrict_protocols())
 		warning("protocol restrictions not applied to curl redirects because\n"
diff --git a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
index ad94ed7b1..22011f0b6 100755
--- a/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
+++ b/t/t5550-http-fetch-dumb.sh
@@ -322,5 +322,43 @@ test_expect_success 'http.followRedirects defaults to "initial"' '
 	test_must_fail git clone $HTTPD_URL/redir-objects/repo.git default
 '
 
+# The goal is for a clone of the "evil" repository, which has no objects
+# itself, to cause the client to fetch objects from the "victim" repository.
+test_expect_success 'set up evil alternates scheme' '
+	victim=$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/victim.git &&
+	git init --bare "$victim" &&
+	git -C "$victim" --work-tree=. commit --allow-empty -m secret &&
+	git -C "$victim" repack -ad &&
+	git -C "$victim" update-server-info &&
+	sha1=$(git -C "$victim" rev-parse HEAD) &&
+
+	evil=$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH/evil.git &&
+	git init --bare "$evil" &&
+	# do this by hand to avoid object existence check
+	printf "%s\\t%s\\n" $sha1 refs/heads/master >"$evil/info/refs"
+'
+
+# Here we'll just redirect via HTTP. In a real-world attack these would be on
+# different servers, but we should reject it either way.
+test_expect_success 'http-alternates is a non-initial redirect' '
+	echo "$HTTPD_URL/dumb/victim.git/objects" \
+		>"$evil/objects/info/http-alternates" &&
+	test_must_fail git -c http.followRedirects=initial \
+		clone $HTTPD_URL/dumb/evil.git evil-initial &&
+	git -c http.followRedirects=true \
+		clone $HTTPD_URL/dumb/evil.git evil-initial
+'
+
+# Curl supports a lot of protocols that we'd prefer not to allow
+# http-alternates to use, but it's hard to test whether curl has
+# accessed, say, the SMTP protocol, because we are not running an SMTP server.
+# But we can check that it does not allow access to file://, which would
+# otherwise allow this clone to complete.
+test_expect_success 'http-alternates cannot point at funny protocols' '
+	echo "file://$victim/objects" >"$evil/objects/info/http-alternates" &&
+	test_must_fail git -c http.followRedirects=true \
+		clone "$HTTPD_URL/dumb/evil.git" evil-file
+'
+
 stop_httpd
 test_done
-- 
2.11.0.191.gdb26c57

[PATCH v2 6/6] http-walker: complain about non-404 loose object errors

From: Jeff King <hidden>
Date: 2016-12-06 18:26:22

Since commit 17966c0a6 (http: avoid disconnecting on 404s
for loose objects, 2016-07-11), we turn off curl's
FAILONERROR option and instead manually deal with failing
HTTP codes.

However, the logic to do so only recognizes HTTP 404 as a
failure. This is probably the most common result, but if we
were to get another code, the curl result remains CURLE_OK,
and we treat it as success. We still end up detecting the
failure when we try to zlib-inflate the object (which will
fail), but instead of reporting the HTTP error, we just
claim that the object is corrupt.

Instead, let's catch anything in the 300's or above as an
error (300's are redirects which are not an error at the
HTTP level, but are an indication that we've explicitly
disabled redirects, so we should treat them as such; we
certainly don't have the resulting object content).

Note that we also fill in req->errorstr, which we didn't do
before. Without FAILONERROR, curl will not have filled this
in, and it will remain a blank string. This never mattered
for the 404 case, because in the logic below we hit the
"missing_target()" branch and print nothing. But for other
errors, we'd want to say _something_, if only to fill in the
blank slot in the error message.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <redacted>
---
The second hunk here is new in v2; earlier it appeared in patch 3. But
arguably it goes better here anyway; I didn't even need to modify the
commit message to explain it.

 http-walker.c | 7 +++++--
 http.c        | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/http-walker.c b/http-walker.c
index 25a8b1ad4..c2f81cd6a 100644
--- a/http-walker.c
+++ b/http-walker.c
@@ -482,10 +482,13 @@ static int fetch_object(struct walker *walker, unsigned char *sha1)
 	 * we turned off CURLOPT_FAILONERROR to avoid losing a
 	 * persistent connection and got CURLE_OK.
 	 */
-	if (req->http_code == 404 && req->curl_result == CURLE_OK &&
+	if (req->http_code >= 300 && req->curl_result == CURLE_OK &&
 			(starts_with(req->url, "http://") ||
-			 starts_with(req->url, "https://")))
+			 starts_with(req->url, "https://"))) {
 		req->curl_result = CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR;
+		xsnprintf(req->errorstr, sizeof(req->errorstr),
+			  "HTTP request failed");
+	}
 
 	if (obj_req->state == ABORTED) {
 		ret = error("Request for %s aborted", hex);
diff --git a/http.c b/http.c
index ff4d88231..c25d1d540 100644
--- a/http.c
+++ b/http.c
@@ -2021,7 +2021,7 @@ static size_t fwrite_sha1_file(char *ptr, size_t eltsize, size_t nmemb,
 		if (c != CURLE_OK)
 			die("BUG: curl_easy_getinfo for HTTP code failed: %s",
 				curl_easy_strerror(c));
-		if (slot->http_code >= 400)
+		if (slot->http_code >= 300)
 			return size;
 	}
 
-- 
2.11.0.191.gdb26c57
Keyboard shortcuts
hback out one level
jnext message in thread
kprevious message in thread
ldrill in
Escclose help / fold thread tree
?toggle this help