Re: Tags

"H. Peter Anvin" [off-list ref] writes:

Eric W. Biederman wrote:

quoted

"H. Peter Anvin" [off-list ref] writes:

Unless you have an authentication mechanism and *enforce* it (you can do that
with GPG signatures if *and only if* your disambiguation includes your GPG
signature fingerprint) you still have a problem with someone introducing fake
tags as a DoS attack.

There is a question of how bad is this.   For releases you certainly
need some kind of signature that people can verify and we
already have that but I think we can keep spoofing tags
down to the same level as spoofing patches.

Basically all this takes is to make your global namespace
the committer email address and you have the rule that
you can only tag your own commits.  Then when you merge
tags you never automatically add tags to your own tag namespace.

I think that is enough to make global tags usable in practice.

And for those who are typing challenged if all you ever
look at are your own tags the you should never need to
specify a fully qualified tag name as git should be able
to find the committer email address through other means.

Eric

Eric W. Biederman wrote:

There is a question of how bad is this.   For releases you certainly
need some kind of signature that people can verify and we
already have that but I think we can keep spoofing tags
down to the same level as spoofing patches.

Basically all this takes is to make your global namespace
the committer email address and you have the rule that
you can only tag your own commits.  Then when you merge
tags you never automatically add tags to your own tag namespace.

Doesn't work.  You can trivially generate a key with someone else's 
address.  It would require a full PKI.

	-hpa

Hi, H. Peter Anvin wrote:

Doesn't work.  You can trivially generate a key with someone else's 
address.  It would require a full PKI.

So you use the GPG key's fingerprint as the directory name, and add
a few strategically named symlinks for convenience. *Shrug*

Besides, what's wrong with requiring full PKI? Everybody who has
a kernel.org account should be in the strongly connected set...

-- 
Matthias Urlichs   |   {M:U} IT Design @ m-u-it.de   |  smurf@smurf.noris.de
Disclaimer: The quote was selected randomly. Really. | http://smurf.noris.de
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